CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

A Quarterly of Christian Thought

HOLBROOK LIBRARY PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

Vol. IV, No. 4 October, 1958

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Subscriptions should be sent to the University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5. Cheques in payment of subscriptions should be made out to University of Toronto Press, payable at par in Toronto.

Subscription Rates

Regular		*Students*	
One Year	$3.00	One Year	$1.50
Two Years	$5.00	Two Years	$3.00

Single issues $1.00

Editorial

INTEGRITY IN PREACHING

MOST preaching is based, in theory at least, on the Bible, however much the preacher is influenced by his own background and tradition. Unfortunately there is a good deal of confusion about the terms Scripture, Authority and Tradition, as illustrated by current discussion of the subject. The last few years has seen the publication of numerous books on these themes, and many church gatherings have addressed themselves to the problems. The Lambeth Conference, still in session as these lines are written, has the subject of the Authority of the Bible prominently on its agenda, and this in turn has led to numerous articles. The everyday life of the Church is affected by the uncertainty, as demonstrated by the rather confused state of many sermons.

In some contemporary preaching one hears a curious anachronism. It would sound as if the preacher were unaware that the last 200 years have radically altered our understanding of the Bible. This has nothing to do with the group commonly called fundamentalists, with whom we are not here concerned, and with whom a different problem exists. Unlike his conservative brethren, the preacher recognizes the results of scholarship in his study, but preaches as if Moses wrote the Pentateuch, David all the Psalms, and God created the world literally in six days. More subtly misleading is the type of sermon reminiscent of Deuteronomic theology, which affirmed that the good are rewarded, the wicked punished. In some way, whether explicitly or by implication, the congregation is assured that Christians are "better" than non-Christians, that the world is white or black according to one's acceptance or rejection of Christianity. In Christ, the believer has no problems, and he is promised a reward, probably a rather material one. This heresy may be carried to such an extent as to make denominational loyalty the basis for the promised reward.

We may suspect that this preaching is based on a limited range of Biblical themes. In a recent article in *The Journal of Bible and Religion*, John A. Cheek speaks of "functional" canons of Scripture. A denomination, a congregation, even an individual tends to limit itself to those passages of Scripture which appeal to it for sentimental or apologetic reasons. Anglicans and others who in theory read all of Scripture in the year's lectionary, are not saved from this error, since preaching tends to neglect the more difficult or less congenial passages. The functional canon may be quite vicious since it may encourage denominational prejudice, as opposed to the expression of worship through forms most familiar. If denominational reward is promised or implied, the vested interests, economic or emotional, in the denomination become that much more unreasoned and unreasonable.

The cause of the above situation, wherever it exists, are manifold. One is the tragic amount of time the clergy are expected to spend in activity and organization, with inevitable detriment to study and thought. Another is the fear of giving offence. Sometimes this is based on real gentleness, sometimes on less worthy feelings, such as unwillingness to "stick one's neck out." Granted that some matters of literary and historical criticism may be red herrings, nonetheless there come times when one must choose who is going to be hurt. The "simple believer" will raise a row with "heretical" or "liberal" preachers. The "pillar of the church" will withdraw his support when he hears what he regards as unbelief from the pulpit. But what about those who are weak in faith, but have learned something of scientific methods and results? They hear in church what they rationally or instinctively know to be at variance with reason and evidence. They can understand perhaps that the Incarnation and Resurrection are profound mysteries of faith, but creation in six days is hard to take. Deuteronomic theology does not fit the facts of the real world in which they must live. Since they are not articulate in religious matters, they do not raise any protest, but, puzzled and offended, quietly drift away.

More important is precisely the uncertainty regarding the nature of Scripture, and of its authority. It is easier to appeal to an apparently infallible book, without raising any questions of error. The rise of the physical sciences, and the permeation of their presuppositions throughout our culture, have made people dependent on concrete facts. A book is a fact and its authority may be weakened if its facts are incorrect. Here again one must risk speaking the truth. Our Lord the Spirit, to paraphrase Charles Williams, permitted sheer intelligence to exist. He permitted the rise of critical rationalism, and saw to its transformation into the exciting synthesis of scientific study and Christian belief. Our minds may not have forged the definition, but the Authority of Scripture is a reality, for in its own terms the Bible bears witness to God's saving acts. The thought-forms need to be interpreted for each new generation, in order that the whole Bible may speak to all men, to the whole man. If we deny our people what our faith and reason know to be true, we limit their grasp of His truth. The Dean of St. Paul's made a wise remark in *The Sunday Times* recently, "There is a danger that *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* may become divorced, which, in the long run, will infect our prayers with unreality." In this matter the verbal truism that the Church works in and for eternity must become a fully accepted fact. The person hurt by the truth is not necessarily lost, unless he chooses to be. It is not the numbers who are attracted or repelled by preaching which is important, but the operation of the Holy Spirit through proclamation of the Gospel. We present the truth; our Lord brings it home to His people in His own way and His own time.

Finally, confusion arises from inadequate evaluation of the tradition in which one is preaching. Protestantism has claimed that ecclesiastical tradi-

tion has little or no authority. If, as is often the case, there is an unconscious tendency to go a step further and deny that one is influenced by traditional patterns of thought, there is real danger. Two recent books, written from entirely different backgrounds, and dealing with different themes, contain important discussions of this issue.

Gabriel Hebert, a member of a religious order in the "High Anglican" tradition, has written *Fundamentalism and the Church of God*. Seldom has profound disagreement been handled in more irenic yet firm manner. The author allows fully for the serious emotional and intellectual gulf which separates schools of thought in the Christian world, but equally clearly shows that much of this is due to human pride and weakness. By insisting that members of a denomination or sect have authority, the sole authority, to interpret the Bible correctly, any group limits the operation of Scripture, and truncates its authority. The value of the differing traditions is that they each emphasize certain necessary truths, but no group can afford to neglect the fuller range of Biblical teaching. Each must learn to evaluate and use what is best in others.

J. D. Benoit, of the Reformed Church in France, points to a similar conclusion. His recent paper, *Liturgical Renewal: Studies in Catholic and Protestant Developments on the Continent*, discusses, among other things, the return of Biblical preaching to some sections of the Roman Catholic Church. This is in line with a number of Papal statements and Encyclicals which call for intensive study of the Bible, and for the reading of Scripture by the laity. The future of this movement is not yet certain since the Curia may at any moment take fright and stop it. Meanwhile, Protestants must recognize that the Word, as well as the Sacraments, is being given a prominent place by many Roman Catholics. Benoit goes on to discuss the power of tradition in non-Roman denominations, and believes that failure to allow for the influence of tradition helps to keep the churches from better understanding of their common bond in love and worship of God.

From these widely different traditions, Anglo-Catholic and Reformed, we are reminded that the ultimate authority is God's Word to man. The Word must direct us; it is not we who must direct the Word. It is a healthy sign that so many people are concerned with the question of the Bible's authority, and with self-criticism of their use of it in their own circles. By the time this issue is published, the Anglican Bishops will have released their report, which should be of interest to the whole Church. We look forward to the appearance of many more books and articles to help us interpret the great doctrines of Scripture, Authority and Tradition. Meanwhile all of us who preach or teach must examine our own attitudes. The practical issues of preaching and teaching need not wait for final conclusions enshrined in formulae.

T.A.M.B.

The Mission of the Church as the Context of Theological Education

WILLIAM A. CLEBSCH

THE mission of the church is a subject of earnest discussion and serious questioning in contemporary theology. The discussion was engendered in revolutionary circumstances among those non-Christian and sub-Christian peoples who have been traditionally understood as the objects of that mission, and in the seeming failure of traditional theories and methods of missionary activity to confront the contemporary situation with the Christian message. The discussion has now extended beyond the specialists in the science of missions, and has stirred the interest of many who are engaged in biblical, historical, and doctrinal studies. Thus Christian mission as a segment or branch of theological knowledge and teaching has become the subject of widespread re-evaluative conversation among theological faculties, church administrators, missionary workers, and leaders of various Christian agencies. As far as I know, never before has a single subject of theological enquiry been so thoroughly investigated, weighed and reported upon by one man as missions has been by O. G. Myklebust, whose prodigious labours are evident in the two volumes of *The Study of Missions in Theological Education*.[1] That study traced the history of the science of missions, its career in the theological schools of the West, its place in present-day curricula, and the development of its specialists and of the chairs (or settees) they occupy. It urged full recognition of the science as an independent and indispensable branch of theological learning.

Two efforts at improving missions study were pointed out by Myklebust. First was that of *addition* or *emphasis*, by which he meant the establishment on theological faculties of chairs of missions filled by technical experts, and the development of major courses of study (both prescribed and optional) in the theological curriculum. He much preferred this path to that of *orientation*, by which he meant the partitioning of the subheadings of missions science and their distribution among the appropriate chairs and disciplines of Bible, history, doctrine and pastoralia. The options of emphasis and orientation are not exclusive of one another, nor did Myklebust present them as if they were. But he contended further that these approaches, even if used in combination to effect changes in curricula, would not secure sufficient attention to missions unless they were accompanied also by a liberal salting of the extracurricular affairs of theological students with missionary presentations, programs, and visits by missionary personnel.

Acknowledging an unamortizable debt to Myklebust's study and to the general discussion of which it is part, I desire nevertheless to assert that the

1. Oslo: Egede Instituttet, 1955, 1957; hereinafter cited as *SMTE*.

present status of missionary thinking and of theological education (especially in America) does not admit a solution of the problem of mission teaching by the approach either of emphasis or of orientation, either by adding specialists and courses in an independent field of missions or by partitioning and distributing that field among established disciplines. Rather, the mission of the church properly is, and demands universal recognition as, the *context* of all theological study and teaching. The church inescapably lives its life and thinks out its proclamation in the context of a single dialogue, a dialogue between Christ as the creating, redeeming agent of God, and human culture as man's expression of his awareness of a status under God. Both polarities claim the whole attention of the church. The dialogue gives the church its essential functional attribute of mission. All theological study and teaching is prompted, controlled and unified by the dialogue. Thus that which makes theology possible is identical with that which constitutes the church as mission. The intimate relation between mission and theology, then, defies simple expression by means of emphasis or by means of orientation. In this sense all theology takes as its controlling context the mission of the church.

I. The Emergence of the Science of Missions

It is of primary significance that the claim of missions to an independent and important place in theological education came to its neoteric articulation at the World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910, in the report of Commission Six on "The Home Base of Missions." Myklebust rightly regarded this Conference as beginning the process of expansion in missions teaching. Now that Conference, which deplored the wholly unsatisfactory status of *missionswissenschaft* (the science of missions) and *missionslehre* (the teaching of missions) and demanded their central place in all theological schools, asserted in confidence of a general agreement on the matter that "the specific purpose of all theological education" was "to prepare men to be able and efficient preachers of the Gospel among all nations." Not only in the Commission's report but quite generally it has been on this assumption that the addition or emphasis of missions courses has been urged, regardless of the degree of the orientation of other "usual theological disciplines" to missions.[2] Now the undeniable importance of Edinburgh 1910 as a major watershed in very modern church history is to be seen in the light of the profound challenges made at that time and since to various assumptions prevailing in the nineteenth century about the church and the world; e.g., the assumption that "older churches" exported Christianity and "younger churches" imported it; the assumption that universal norms of Christian faith and action were to be found in the infusion of Christian principles into the then plainly dominant civilization of the West; the assumption that the major western reformed churches possessed the resources with which Asia and Africa were to be Christianized; the assumption that the geographical areas of Christendom were and would remain under Christian

2. *SMTE* II, cf. *World Missionary Conference 1910*, VI, pp. 162–181.

allegiance. Such assumptions were carried confidently in 1910 to Edinburgh. But after Amsterdam 1948 it was manifest that they had been radically (although implicitly) challenged at Edinburgh and had been progressively discarded during the intervening years.

II. The New Goal in General Theological Education

Silently perhaps but nonetheless surely the leading assumptions about theological study and education were also challenged during that generation, so that this phase of Christian endeavor also has been transformed. A current crisis in the Faith and Order Commission illustrates the change that has taken place. The grounding of theological study in confessional or denominational traditions, together with the self-consciousness of theological teachers as trainers of ministers, made possible the comparative ecclesiology on which the Faith and Order Movement proceeded; but the Faith and Order Commission finds the approach of comparative ecclesiology at an impasse—and the underlying reason for the impasse is the emergence of an ecumenical theological interest and a new self-consciousness among theologians as to the purpose of their work.[3] Recent penetrating studies of North American centers of theological education reveal a new consciousness of their purpose as the advancing of knowledge of the Christian revelation in terms of the thought-forms of contemporary culture with due regard to the problem of the adequacy of these thought-forms to perform such a function. To be sure, the training of ministers remains an indispensable function of this work, but its directing purpose is seen far more broadly today than it was a half-century ago, as the provision of centers of the intellectual activity of the church, of loving God and neighbor with the mind.[4] The specific purpose of a theological school is to be peculiarly and unashamedly (though not condescendingly) an intellectual enterprise in the name of and for the sake of the whole church, dedicated to clarifying for a time and place God's revelation in Christ and to appraising critically the patterns of human response to that revelation. Their function is to admit the prospective leadership of the church, both clerical and lay, into the circle of their discourse, for the sake of offering their thought along with every other feature of church life to the praise of God and the service of the world. By its very nature the enterprise is incurably critical, for it must reflect upon and articulate the church's failures to respond to the revelation along with her successes, failures past and failures present, in order that future responses may be more singularly loyal to the revelation and more penetrating of human cultures.

Meanwhile, during this transformation in the character and consciousness of theological education, the actual process of training men and women for the program of the churches' work has come to be conducted, quite

3. Comparative ecclesiology is the study by comparison and contrast of the doctrinal beliefs of the Christian denominations and particularly of their doctrines of the church.

4. Cf. H. R. Niebuhr, *The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry* (New York, 1956) esp. ch. 3.

properly, by the programming agencies of the church: local, regional, national and otherwise. At every point the intellectual endeavor interacts with the actual training process, and care needs to be taken to insure a relation of mutually critical co-operation between the two, for their separation is as harmful as is the failure to distinguish between them. The atmosphere of the former is that of unfettered, critical investigation; of the latter, that of the urgency of the next practical step. Insofar as missions is to be understood as the work of an ecclesiastical agency, the promotion of its program rightly belongs to the agency, which must focus attention not only upon future church leaders but also upon present ones. Within the same understanding of missions the role of theological study and teaching is that of investigation and appraisal under the norms of the commission of God to His folk and the circumstances of the peoples of His world.

The acceptance by theological educators of an investigating and critical role in the life of the church makes theological education an inappropriate vehicle for training young men and women for the particular tasks of world evangelization. But, as I hope to show, it also puts it under an even weightier responsibility to the mission of the church.

III. Church and Mission?

How is "the Christian mission" or "the mission of the church" or "missions" regarded in our day? Again largely owing to movements originated or influenced by the World Missionary Conference—the Life and Work Movement, the Faith and Order Movement, the World Council of Churches, the International Missionary Council, world-wide confessional conferences and the national Christian councils—the concept of mission has undergone radical rethinking and transformation. The change in this conception is perhaps best epitomized by the saying so frequently repeated by missionary thinkers: the church does not *have* missions; the church *is* mission. Needless to say, this reorientation of the definition of mission as constitutive of the church, away from a notion of missions as constituted by the church, involves a number of revolutionary ideas. No longer is a simple geographical denotation of the term "mission" possible, and no longer, *mutatis mutandis*, can the history of missions be regarded simply as the geographical expansion of churches. Perhaps more disruptive is the evacuation of economic designations of missions as dependent ecclesiastical organizations (although this practical denotation seems at present ineradicably fixed in the minds of church administrators). Neither can there be maintained under the concept of the church as mission the great nineteenth-century extension of Henry Venn's idea of the goal of missionary enterprise (as the building of self-supporting, self-governing, self-propagating churches) into the distinguishing mark between church and mission. However, the more embracing idea of mission as the constitutive attribute of the church is not intended to generalize "mission" until the term bears no specific meaning. Designation of the church as mission, wholly responsible to the

dialogue between Christ and culture, indicates that the church is sent, not sender; the herald of redemptive revelation, not its imparter; the urger of grateful response to redemption in the full variety of human cultures, not the systematizer of "religion" in the sense of one such historic response in obedience to which all cultures must be brought.

IV. The Science of Missions: its Field and Sponsors

Missionswissenschaft must, like any other science, mark off its field of primary investigative interest. Just here arises the problem today. If approached historically as investigating the theory and practice of missions (various enough in itself!) according to recently outmoded understandings of "missions," the science is manageable but irrelevant to contemporary missionary conversations. If approached from the standpoint of contemporary missionary conversations, the science becomes so diffuse as to banish all distinctions among traditional theological disciplines. It seems remarkable that the significant contributions to the development of a new and far-reaching understanding of the mission of the church in this century came, on the whole, not from the specialists in the science of missions but rather from persons whose disciplines were systematic and historical and biblical theology. To be sure, the work of scholars in the latter fields came to bear upon the understanding of missions more prominently after 1925, as Myklebust points out.[5] It is nevertheless difficult to omit mention of the fact that the major terms of missionary debate in the last two decades were posed by two men, Kraemer and Hocking, whose scholarly specialties were not missions but, respectively, linguistics and philosophy! Now nobody would assert seriously that the church *is* the Bible, or biblical theology, or church history, or patristics, or historical theology, or dogmatics, or ethics, or moral theology, or worship, or preaching, or pastoral care, or Christian education, or hymnody. One hastens to say that experts in these fields often act as though they wish they might reasonably make that assertion for their specialties, yet they refrain, in the interest of making sense of their studies if for no other reason. That they may at times make omnivorous curricular claims for their fields of interest is due to no serious identification of the church with their specialty, but rather is one of the dangers of proceeding without a conscious understanding of mission as the ruling context for theological education. The claim for missions as a *separate* field of study tends to surrender the mission as the *context* of all theological studies and teaching. The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches has attributed "reluctance on the part of the theological faculties and colleges to institute the study of missions as an independent subject" to the presupposition of "a static, rather than a missionary church" and to a consequent failure of sufficient concern "with the task of taking the Gospel to those outside."[6] That

5. *SMTE* II, 17.
6. *The Calling of the Church to Missions and to Unity* (1951), p. 7, quoted by *SMTE* II, p. 288.

seems an accurate enough description of theological education in 1910 in many places, but it hardly does justice to the anomaly of the science of missions in 1951, when "taking the Gospel to those outside" was at the least a very problematical demarcation of the field of study of missions.

The science of missions and the teaching of missions are youthful enterprises in Western Christianity, traceable in their foundation to the work of German and Scottish scholars of about a century ago. At that time the continuous tradition of North American theological education was itself very young and by no means was accorded its present place in church life. There existed a general receptivity to missions teaching in the Presbyterian churches, due to their congenial combination of universalizing evangelical theology with high educational interest. Anglicans and Lutherans, however, have "paid but scant attention to the missionary education of their clergy."[7] On the whole the independent science of missions grew in the theological schools of church traditions of biblical, rather than those of doctrinal or ecclesiological, orientation. With specific regard to American theological schools, the *independence* of missions study seems to have been declared within biblically emphatic church traditions at a time when their biblical scholarship was *literalistic and static*. The fact that missions teaching among Anglicans fell to church historians by and large, while giving the impression of relegation to a status of dependence, nevertheless gave to missions a certain prominence of association with ecclesiological study.

But today biblical theology is generally alive again, very largely because of a new emphasis in the understanding of the choosing and commissioning of Israel, old and new, for missionary vocations. That is as salutary a development as is the apparent necessity, in the light of the ecumenical movement, for a thorough re-evaluation of traditional ecclesiology in the context of the assertion that the church is, and does not simply have, mission. For these developments to spring from either a dependent or an independent science of missions gives cause for thanksgiving. Perhaps the accomplishment of new missionary understandings could reach farther into theological education if the issue of the dependence or independence of a now frighteningly diffuse science commanded less attention and the claim of the Christian mission to be the matrix of all Christian thought were granted.

V. A Distinctive American Approach

The total situation of the American churches indicates a unique opportunity for mission study and teaching here today. Myklebust reminded us of the startling leadership provided by these churches to the missionary enterprise at the middle of our century. More than one-half of the personnel and more than three-quarters of the funds of the total Christian world mission came in 1950 from the U.S.A. In the same year American theological schools had three times as many persons devoting their full energies to teaching missions as had the rest of the Protestant world. The

7. *SMTE* II, p. 219, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 323 f.

ecumenical leader Adolf Keller has observed that theological seminaries provide "the most important link in the whole chain of North American missionary effort."[8]

American church life in its total pattern stands as a bridge between the lingering impetuses of European church-societies, extended into our generation by post-Reformation confessionalism, and the purely voluntary character of the younger churches which bear their witness in the milieu of the pluralistic, renascent cultures of Asia, Africa and Latin America. More than anywhere else in the world today, Christianity in America combines strong numerical and material resources with a relatively fresh recollection of having benefited from the missionary efforts of the older churches. Thus at ecumenical gatherings Americans seem to Europeans identifiable with younger churches for their practical bent and their youthful aggressiveness, while seeming to younger churchmen closely linked to the European churches from which they historically derived and whose stamp they still bear in many ways. In brief, American Christians can remember Christendom while knowing full well that their own era is beyond Christendom. This situation is reflected in their theological education which in this century has shown itself remarkably open to creative influences from the traditionally organized theological faculties of Europe, and at the same time restless to break the traditionalism and traditional intellectualism which are said to tempt European theology. Somewhere between the continental proposal of missions as an independent science or the British option of partitioning missions among the established disciplines on the one hand, and on the other hand the tendency in the younger churches to regard their entire experience so unilaterally as an experience in "missions" that scant particular attention can be given the matter, lies a viable approach for American theological education.

VI. Several Suggestions

Out of these observations there spring several suggestions about the operation of theological education in the context of the mission of the church.

The entire range of theological study, from Hebrew to Homiletics, takes as its ruling context and theme the mission of God's Israel to the world. The character and content of the mission are progressively unfolded in Biblical studies. The conditioning of the response to the mission by a variety of human cultures is amply illustrated by the Christian study of history, including in that field a sufficient breadth of man's activity to clarify the qualitatively equal demand of that mission upon all human religions including the Christian religion. The demand and characteristic human responses to it provide the matter of systematic theological reflection, as the thought-patterns of a given time and place provide its form. The communicative vehicles of that mission and viable patterns of response to it in a given culture are the data of pastoralia.

8. *SMTE* II, pp. 327 ff., quoting Keller, *American Christianity Today.*

The *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of the inescapable mission of Christianity are so variable as to demand the skills of all branches of theology for their elucidation. The boundaries from, across and to which a Christian may be sent are very various: linguistic, social, educational, geographical, racial, religious, political, economic, regional, professional, to name but a few examples. Certainly no imaginable proliferation of ecclesiastical administrative bureaus could manage to designate an official agency for each possible boundary. Above all the traditional tendency to regard spatial remoteness as the measure of mission is to be discarded in a day when temporal distances have virtually vanished. In a word, the Christian mission is eminently more variable than the church departments bearing its name would indicate. The widest variety of theological labors is needed to explicate and articulate for our day its manifold forms.

The demand of the Christian revelation for the transformation of every cultural and religious circumstance makes it imperative that the teaching of the mission of the church be made available in its full breadth to all Christian workers. A missionary calling is at its height when the recipient of the call is sent to the most alien circumstance he can imagine. In a pluralistic society the missionary vocation may mean for a given person the pastorate of what he calls his home parish. Apart from deep reflection upon the church's whole experience of mission, preparation for any piece of Christian work is defective. No single, independent science, nor even the sum of several such, can accomplish that reflection. The whole of the church's experience in its constitutive function is the uniting element of the most diverse theological disciplines. Without the mission of the church as the single context of all theological study and teaching, no single discipline can adequately perform its task.

The differentiation of functions among a theological faculty working in the context of the Christian mission consists less in a parcelling out of the prerogatives of departments of theological learning, and more in a specifying of responsibilities for dimensions of Christian thought and life. Given reasonable time, any passably intelligent theological professor could ably teach any subject of the theological curriculum and find himself comfortably ahead of the modern crop of students. But the church historian with a strong interest in canon law soon wearies of hermeneutics without a biblical theologian around who is willing to function as his colleague and thereby to keep him honest. Probably in most theological faculties in North America today there is still need for a colleague specifically responsible for the dimension of the mission of the church in the whole range of disciplines. But if so he will be needed as a colleague and his task will be one marked by responsibility rather than by academic prerogative. He will be a busy beaver, and he will read the exegetes and theologians and philosophers and poets as well as the historians of religions and the letters from missionaries and the daily newspapers. What he says to his colleagues will depend upon him and upon them and upon the appropriate mode of conversation in his collegium.

But in conversation with them he must somehow be, not as with fellow-specialists but precisely as with colleagues without whose companionship in study and teaching his responsibility for missions cannot be borne. He may even offer a course on missions as such, but if he does he will discover himself to be teaching Bible and history and doctrine and pastoralia—all from the standpoint of the Christian mission—which is just what he is to expect his colleagues to be doing.

Logic and Theology

TERENCE PENELHUM

THIS article has been written in the belief that an introductory survey and appraisal of some recent work in the philosophy of religion done by members of the most influential and productive group of English-speaking philosophers would be of service to readers of the *Journal*. How far theologians should take account of it is not for a philosopher to say, but I would at least express a regret that the different paths which philosophers and theologians have taken in the last decade or two seem to have made fruitful debate between them rare and difficult. A new series of books published by the S.C.M. Press is intended to increase the chances of such communication, and I intend to discuss the essays collected in one of them.[1] I shall, in the first place make some remarks on the philosophical climate which produced them; secondly, say a little about the special relationship of religious discourse to philosophical analysis; thirdly, make some expository and critical comments on individual essays in the book; and lastly, make a few general observations.

I

Any book of essays should be judged on the merits of the individual contributions, and although the editors rightly warn against any attempt to force them into "some preconceived matrix of misunderstanding," their warning need not preclude a cautious orientation of the sort I am attempting. The editors specifically try to combat the assumption that because all the contributions might reasonably be called "analytical" their writers can be written off as "Logical Positivists."[2] If this were an accurate description, theologians might well consider the contents of the volume to be of no interest to them; and in view of the all-or-nothing dogmatism of the philosophy which properly went under this label in the Thirties no one could blame them. Fortunately the label is now entirely inappropriate; and the best way to see this is to read this book. (Compare any of these essays with Chapter VI of Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*, where the same matters are summarily dealt with.[3]) Logical Positivism can now be seen as just one phase of a philosophical revolution that has been taking place during the last half-century. To characterize it adequately is impossible; but it seems to me to be so different from the kind of change that took place in theology

1. Antony Flew and Alasdaire MacIntyre (eds.), *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (London: SCM: Library of Philosophy and Theology, 1955).
2. See the editors' Preface, p. ix.
3. London: Gollancz, 1936; 2nd edn., 1946. This book was, and deserved to be, very widely read. But I have often thought that it has been unfortunate for the reputation of philosophy among the general public that it *was* such a good book, for the views it put forward with such force and clarity were too elemental to last for long.

during the same period that some attempt to describe it is worth making, in spite of the obvious dangers.[4]

The early stages of philosophical analysis were dominated by the work of Russell and Wittgenstein. The enormous development in formal logic, for which Russell was largely responsible, suggested to them a view of the nature of language modelled upon it. According to this view, language can be regarded as a calculus-like set of propositions built up from certain simple propositions with the aid of logical notions like "and," "or," and "not." This would mean that every proposition depends for its truth or falsity upon the truth or falsity of the simple propositions out of which it is built. For example, the complete proposition "This is red and square" would depend for its truth or falsity on the truth or falsity of its constituent propositions "This is red" and "This is square." To this affirmation was added the (logically independent) empiricist view that the basic propositions are reports of sense-experiences, and that the terms in them derive their meaning from the sensory facts they are used to report. From this combination of two bold doctrines, one old and one new, the whole analytical programme followed. The question might naturally be asked whether this account is supposed to describe languages like English and French, or to describe some idealized language. The answer is that insofar as English and French are composed of significant words and sentences, the account is intended to describe both. For it amounts to saying that *all* significant utterances are constructed out of simply verifiable or falsifiable statements of sense-experience, so that this structure would belong to all significant statements in any language. What would distinguish a natural language from an ideal one would be the fact that in a natural language the relationship of many statements to the sense-statements on which they depend would not be obvious, whereas in an ideal one it would be obvious. The task of the philosophical analyst is to break up statements of ordinary speech into the simple constituent parts out of which they are built up. When one tries to do this, however, there are some cases which, *prima facie*, seem amenable to this sort of analysis, and others which do not. In spite of its grammatical simplicity, "The cat is on the mat" looks to anyone who has read Berkeley as if it *might* be analysable into statements about my sensations; but "Dishonesty is ignoble" or "God loves us" do not. Yet from the theory it follows that if they cannot be analysed in this way, they are not propositions at all; that is they are meaningless, even though grammatically they appear to be quite respectable. So our ordinary language differs from an ideal one in that it contains grammatically correct sentences which are in fact without meaning.

The Positivists' famous Verification Principle is merely a more robust way of asserting the same belief. The fact that a statement is grammatical, or even that it is often made, is no guarantee that it is meaningful: the

4. For extended accounts see J. O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis* and *The Revolution in Philosophy* (ed. Gilbert Ryle).

criterion for meaningfulness is whether or not the person making a statement can indicate what sense-experiences would confirm or refute it. Our natural language was thus divided into two halves, and the most that could be said for utterances that fell foul of the criterion was that they might have some function as non-informative expressions of feeling. They include metaphysical and theological statements, of course, and moral and aesthetic ones. Regarding this list even the hardiest thinker will want to raise some objection, and one ground of objection is obvious, viz. the great variety of *differences* that can be found both among these proscribed groups and within them. Perhaps wholesale philosophical divisions like this are not entirely useless, since they emphasize the oft-neglected difference between all the things on one side of the dividing-line and all the things on the other; but they have the attendant glaring disadvantage that they obscure the actual character of what they classify by ignoring the equally important differences and special features to be found within each of the two sundered areas.

The detailed description of the various forms of discourse that make up our living language is the most conspicuous feature of contemporary philosophical analysis, which owes its character to thinkers like Ryle, Moore, and Wisdom, but most of all to the later Wittgenstein, who repudiated his earlier view of language as a static structure composed of propositions which mirror facts. Some post-Wittgensteinian commonplaces are: that words are *tools* that we use, that the conventions governing their use are as various as the activities in which we use them, and that the stating of facts (itself by no means a homogeneous sort of activity) is only one among their uses. On this view the philosopher's task is to come to understand those features of our use of language (particularly our use of certain key words like "knowledge," "cause," "good," "freedom," "obligation" etc.) the misunderstanding of which gives rise to philosophical problems, rather than to try to provide translations of statements into simpler parts, each of which reports some sense-experience. The new approach makes it easy to see why such translations were never in practice forthcoming. The fact that there are differences among various kinds of statement precludes the "reduction" of one kind to another.[5]

Although this break has been radical, certain traditions persist from the earlier analytical period. Philosophy is still thought of as "not a theory but an activity."[6] The philosopher is not in any way a rival of the scientist, and does not claim to know more about the kind of world we live in than anyone else does. His skill must lie in the clarification of discourse, not in the enunciation of highly general pseudo-scientific theories about the structure of the universe, though the examination of the motives behind such enunciations may be of very great analytical interest. Metaphysics, in other words,

5. See Isaiah Berlin, "Logical Translation," in the *Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society*, 1949–50; also F. Waismann, "Language Strata," in *Logic and Language* (ed. Flew), (2nd series, Blackwell, 1953).

6. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 4.112.

is often examined, but not *done*.[7] And the discovery of Russell that the grammatical form of a sentence is no guide at all to what a person using it is saying could still be regarded as the most important linguistic truth to which his successors subscribe.[8]

II

It is not possible to discuss examples of the newer techniques other than the ones in this book. It is therefore important to mention one respect in which the examination of the religious and theological use of words, with which the authors in it are concerned, is in a special position. The investigation of the ways in which we talk in such spheres as science, day-to-day factual communication, or even moral argument, is a descriptive and not a critical task.[9] The criticism is kept for philosophers who misrepresent these ways, for example in professing wholesale scepticism with regard to one area of discourse as a consequence of applying to it standards belonging to another, as Hume did when he attacked inductive reasoning for being bad deduction, and as his opponents in turn did when they tried to show that it was good deduction or as intuitionists did when they likened moral judgements to mathematical or sensory ones. There is little sympathy for attacks on, or defences of, inductive or moral reasoning as such.[10] When one attempts to describe the manifold religious uses of language, however, the position is different. One can hardly say that the status of religious discourse as such is uncontroversial, for there exist many people who disapprove of engaging in it. Hence we find in this book that the description of the religious use of words is not carried on without judgements of its legitimacy. This is not due to any difference in method, but is a reflection of division of opinion on the subject-matter. Some of the authors claim that they detect in the religious use of language radical incoherencies that make its status questionable because they prevent it from making sense. These sceptical contributors claim that inconsistencies in religious discourse do not only rob it of intelligibility but that they are, unfortunately, of the essence of religious belief and cannot be explained as incidental results of the transcendent character of its object. To quote, " . . . the real intellectual difficulty for the believer or would-be believer is not the problem of proof but the problem of meaning."[11] The fact that other contributors try to meet this difficulty by the same methods as the sceptics use to raise it is proof enough that

7. This is too simple, but space is short. What I should say is that the questions metaphysicians have attempted to answer are still of central interest (if preferred, we are still in the Great Tradition), but it is generally supposed and often demonstrated that the way to answer them is not to construct *a priori* cosmologies but to reveal by gradual analysis that the question is unreal or is after all a matter for one of the natural sciences. On this see Essay II in this volume.

8. See Antony Flew's introduction to his anthology *Logic and Language* (1st series, Blackwell, 1951).

9. For an interesting and partially dissident discussion of this see the essay by J. O. Urmson in *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (ed. Flew), (Macmillan, 1956).

10. See Flew in the present volume pp. 183–185.

11. See Prior, p. 3.

philosophy of this sort is not essentially sceptical as Positivism was. But even if this fact had been obscured by every essay in the book being sceptical in tone, what the authors say would still have a claim on the attention of theologians, because all the conclusions reached are reached by careful examination of religious beliefs, and are not deduced from some remote logical theory. The cards are all on the table, and theologians can with integrity subscribe to the rules of the game. They are no longer playing with someone who makes his own rules and who includes among them the rule that all his own cards are trumps.

III

The first essay, by A. N. Prior, is called "Can Religion be Discussed?" It takes the form of a dialogue among Barthian Protestant, Modernist Protestant, Catholic, Logician, and Psychoanalyst, and reveals simply and worryingly how each makes his position impregnable by moves which also preclude any argument with the others. Catholic insists he agrees that Logician can scrutinize his doctrines, but this veneer of reasonableness involves a rigid conservatism in the choice of logical categories, which enables him to make statements like "God is His own goodness," to which Logician objects. He objects that such statements are not reasonable but paradoxically senseless; but he in his turn is stumped by Barthian's cheerful acceptance of the fact of paradox, of the irrationality of faith and our dependence for it on divine grace rather than argument. Logician's moves are hints of what is to follow in the other essays; Barthian's are not discussed by name, but the problem of paradox in religious utterances comes up again and again, either in the form "Is such and such a doctrine paradoxical?" or in the form "What are we to *make* of religious paradox if we find it?"

There follow two papers by J. J. C. Smart: "Metaphysics, Logic, and Theology" and "The Existence of God." The thesis of the former is that philosophical analysis is a necessary tool in theology as well as in philosophy, because theological problems have clear affinities with metaphysical ones, and these should be tackled by examining the conceptual difficulties underlying them. There are some helpful comments on the task of the philosopher as many contemporaries see it, and the charge of superficiality often levelled against the sort of philosophical work they do. The latter paper is a clear survey of the classical objections to the classical arguments for God's existence, along with some interesting new incidental points.

A notion which Smart discussed is central in the next essay and the two rejoinders which follow it. This is the notion of a necessary being, crucial to the traditional Ontological and Cosmological Proofs. It has been routine philosophical procedure since Kant to write these proofs off as fallacious on the grounds that "existence is not a predicate" and cannot therefore be "included in the concept of" any kind of thing, a deity included. J. N. Findlay gives a new twist to this objection, under the heading "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" He holds that the concept of a necessary being

is (i) "self-evidently absurd" and (ii) the inevitable consequence of the attempt to express the demands of the "religious attitude." From this it follows that God, previously defined as the "adequate object of religious attitudes," cannot exist. Issue could be taken either with (i) or with (ii), and the two dissentients who follow concentrate on (i). They agree, that is, that it is a necessary feature of Theism to regard God not merely as great and good, etc., but as great and good superlatively and unsurpassably, and therefore as great and good in some way which makes a greater and better inconceivable, and therefore as great and good necessarily, that is, indistinguishably from His greatness and goodness; this leads us further (the Cosmological Proof) to think of the dependence of other things upon Him as a necessary matter, not just a matter of fact, and finally to think of His existence as necessary and not as a merely contingent fact which might conceivably have been otherwise (the Ontological Proof). They agree that it is incompatible with worshipping God to think of Him as merely *happening* to possess the qualities He has, or as merely *happening* to exist. This certainly seems to me to uncover the motive at work in the minds of those who have resorted to these proofs, but I must insert a query: if Findlay were to turn out to be right in (i), could this not be used by a Theist as an argument for saying that the demands of worship require us only to go as far as in thinking as we can *without* falling under his strictures? Just as it cannot be regarded as a limitation on God's power that he is unable to commit logical absurdities like creating round squares, surely it cannot be regarded as making Him less worthy of worship that He cannot *be* a logical absurdity like a necessary being or a being indistinguishable from His own goodness—assuming for the moment that these *are* logical absurdities? Would it, as Findlay and Hughes say, be idolatrous to worship a being who is infinitely good and powerful but merely happens to be so without any logical necessity? Could God's existence not be the most important of all the contingent facts in the universe, a fact on which all the others causally depend? I make this (possibly dangerous) suggestion here because it does not seem to me that the writers make much headway through the jungle of perplexities that springs up when it is taken for granted that God has to exist "in some necessary manner." I would urge my suggestion rather more strongly in the case of God's existence than in the case of His qualities.

To return to Findlay: his argument is that Theism entails the claim that God is a necessary being, that is, that "God exists" is a necessary proposition; Theism must be false because "God exists" *cannot* be a necessary proposition. This he claims follows from the modern view that all necessary propositions are tautologies (like "Brothers are male"), and that tautologies merely reflect verbal conventions and cannot tell us about matters of fact. G. E. Hughes' answer to this is the obvious one that no one is compelled to accept the "modern" view of this matter. If one agrees (against Anselm) that "God exists" is not a tautology, then one can just say that here we have one necessary proposition which is not tautological. It is not even necessary

to claim there are any others. This is to take refuge, quite properly perhaps, in the uniqueness of all statements about God; but in my opinion its consequence is the abandonment of all hope of making clear what is meant by saying that God exists necessarily. The enormous advantage of the theory that all necessary propositions are tautologies is that it affords an *explanation* of their necessity (thus giving us profound insight into the special character of logic and mathematics), which is something that believers in the existence of *synthetic* necessary truths have always found it difficult to give, to say the least.

Another reply is made by A. C. A. Rainer, who says that to assert God is a necessary being is not to say that "God exists" is a necessary proposition, but to make a direct assertion about God Himself, viz. to assert His "complete actuality, indestructibility, *aseitas*, or independence of limiting conditions." If this is what is meant, then of course nothing of what Findlay says need matter, because if I state that these attributes belong to God my *statement* could be held to be contingent and not necessary (my suggestion above).[12] But he does not take this comparatively simple way out; instead he says, a little lower down, that the assertion that God has a certain attribute (and, I think, the assertion of His existence) is necessary, but only "relative to God's omniscience and not to human reason or experience." This seems to mean that such assertions are necessary but that we cannot see it, because we do not understand them well enough to grasp their necessary character. This is not a new view, but it is not an easy one either. It could mean that by all the criteria we use for necessity, these statements are not necessary, but that they are necessary for God; which entails that the word "necessary" is being used in a different way when it is said they are necessary for God. Admittedly necessity is not a pellucid notion, but the question at issue is whether these assertions about God are necessary in *our* sense (whatever precisely this sense may be), not in some other. On the other hand it could mean that when we make statements about God we *say* more than we *mean*, that if we understood our own words better we would see we were uttering necessary and not contingent statements; but this is a very uncomfortable view, making religious statements seem like Freudian slips without the chance of psychoanalysis. A third way of reading this view, and to my mind by far the most promising, is to regard it as the theory that in religious utterance we *mean* more than we can *say*, that language is inadequate to

12. There is a dangerous ambiguity in the word "contingent." It is sometimes used to mean "conditioned" or "dependent." In this sense states of affairs are said to be contingent *upon* other states of affairs. In its other sense it applies to propositions; this sense is harder to define, but might be roughly characterized as "not necessary." A contingent proposition in this latter sense may be true, but it is not true by necessity, or cannot be seen to be true merely by inspection. (The only clear definition that has been offered of necessity in this sense is in terms of tautology, and this begs questions at issue here regarding the possibility of synthetic necessary truth.) It is in this latter sense that I suggest that "God exists" is a contingent statement, since it would clearly be theologically absurd to suggest that God's existence is contingent in the former sense. What would make the assertion of God's existence unique, then, would be that the fact this statement claims to record would be the only one in the universe which is not contingent in the first sense. Is not this enough?

express the facts with which people claim to be confronted in religious awareness, and that the expression of these facts in ideal language would be in the form of necessary propositions, though our ignorant attempts to articulate them in ordinary terms are not. But does a Theist need to take Rainer's stand on this matter, in any of these three forms?

Such lines of thought lead to the problem of using our ordinary language to talk about God. This problem is analysed by Flew, Hare, Mitchell, and Crombie in "Theology and Falsification," a group of short papers which became widely known before being reprinted in this collection.[13]

Flew presents a simple and direct challenge to the believer. To understand a statement one has to know what would be the case if it were true, and this essentially involves knowing what is ruled out by it. Any statement which is said to be true in all possible circumstances tells us nothing, since only if there are at least some conceivable circumstances which could falsify it does it make a claim about any matter of fact. Statements about God, for example that He loves us, appear to be in this category of empty statements, because although the use in them of ordinary words like "love" suggests that certain sorts of fact count in favour of them and certain opposite ones count against (since this is the fundamental feature of the ordinary use of these words), the believer refuses to admit that the most extreme (actual *or* imagined) disasters could falsify them. So to claim that, say, God loves us, is to assert nothing, while appearing to do so by using ordinary words.

One could say in reply that religious statements are not intended as assertions, but merely as expressions of an attitude to life; and though I have put it crudely, this is in fact what Hare does say. But it is unsatisfying and unorthodox.[14] Religious assertions have to be assertions, even though unusual ones. Mitchell agrees, and stresses that the facts of evil and suffering do count against the claim that God loves us, but, to the believer at least, not conclusively. This is the source of the theological problem of evil and the personal trial of faith. Flew appears to accept this as a partial answer, but it is worth saying that the believer could surely be challenged to say what would count against his assertions conclusively, even though of course he does not expect whatever it might be to occur. Crombie in fact does offer an answer to this question, and much of what he says could be used to supplement Mitchell's points. According to him, what would count against God's love conclusively would be "suffering which was utterly, eternally, and irredeemably pointless." He says that the believer looks for the life of the world to come, in which the whole picture will be revealed and the evil

13. It was this discussion I had primarily in mind when composing the public lecture later revised and printed in the *University of Toronto Quarterly* under the title "Faith, Fact, and Philosophy" (October, 1956).

14. For a full critique of Hare see H. J. N. Horsburgh in the *Philosophical Quarterly* (July, 1956). A position akin to Hare's, and containing an explicit identification of religion with the adoption of certain moral commitments, may be found in R. B. Braithwaite's Eddington Memorial Lecture, *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief* (Cambridge, England, 1955).

and suffering will be seen not to be pointless. This is only a part of Crombie's candid and moving paper, but it bears most directly on what has gone before. Faced with this argument the sceptic can shift his attack to the intelligibility of talk about the future life,[15] and to the logical possibility of evil and suffering ever being explained away at all.[16] But one can hardly expect one paper to handle all this, and of course argument about either of these matters is not on the ground that Flew originally chose.

Crombie also deals with the question of predicating ordinary terms like "good" and "loving" of God. He says that as applied to the Deity they are used in their ordinary, not in an analogical sense, but with the understanding that as so used they are not adequate but merely seem appropriate. He likens this use of them to the use of language in parables. But without more explanation of the function of a parable, it does not seem to me that this position differs very clearly from the old claim that such words are used analogically.

A word of my own on this controversy: it is necessary, I think, to distinguish between the *kind* of evidence one uses for or against a statement, and the *way* the evidence is used. Flew might have done this more clearly, since it could be retorted to him (and this would seem to be Crombie's reply) that the believer's oddity lies not in the way he uses his evidence, as Flew holds, but in the kind of evidence to which he appeals, at least when pressed. It would indeed be a hangover of Positivism to insist that all the evidence has to be observable. To take this line of defence would expose the believer to many problems, not the least of which would be that of making his references to non-natural evidence intelligible; but these would not be quite the same as the problem Flew begins with.

The best paper in the book is probably Flew's "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom." I summarize his thesis: recent discussion of the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will suggests there is no contradiction in saying that an action is free (and therefore accountable) and also takes place in accordance with the laws of nature. It is therefore not necessary to look for gaps in scientific understanding to locate human freedom. If this attempted resolution of the problem is sound, it has important consequences for the problem of explaining the presence of evil in a world created by an omnipotent and benevolent God. The most popular and reasonable-looking answer to this latter has been that the possibility of evil is a necessary condition of human freedom, since it is self-contradictory to suggest that God could have created the world in such a way that all men would freely choose rightly and not wrongly. But if the above-mentioned resolution of the freewill problem is correct, this suggestion is not self-contradictory, and this classic answer to the problem of evil collapses. At present this seems to me conclusive. The only way to reject Flew's conclusion is to reject the solution to

15. See, e.g., Flew and Mackinnon in Essay XV.
16. See, e.g., Flew in Essay VIII, and J. L. Mackie in *Mind* (April, 1955).

the freewill question from which it follows, but this is something that (emphatically) no one should do without examining it independently of this theological consequence.[17]

It is not possible to comment on the remaining nine essays, though I must mention C. B. Martin's "The Perfect Good," in which the necessary connection between God and His qualities is again explored, and the author claims that it logically precludes the possibility of the Incarnation.[18]

IV

To conclude, I offer a few general words on the main trends in the book. The writers are concerned throughout with deciding how and how far religious statements are to be *understood*, and not with the more usual problem of deciding on their truth assuming their meaning to be grasped. The issues they raise are therefore prior to the more familiar ones of truth and falsity. The sceptics here are uncertain what they are being asked to accept; they are not arguing against theological assertions by bringing forward counter-evidence, for example, from biology. Since this sort of attack is more sophisticated than that of the nineteenth-century sceptics it is at one and the same time less likely to gain wide currency among the lay public and more difficult to answer. As a philosopher of similar stamp I am only making an external judgement when I say that the problems raised are fundamental. But this fact seems hardly to be doubted. It follows that the philosophical aim of investigating the religious use of language on its own ground has been at least partially a success, and that no one here is trying to judge it in terms of some standard appropriate only outside it. The most perplexing of all the problems raised is the one which bears most directly on this question of the standards by which religious language is to be judged, viz. the problem of paradox in religious statement. Every theologian knows that in describing the Christian religion he is likely to utter paradoxes. Some hope they are only apparent, and others seem to glory in them. If they are entitled to glory in them, then anyone who regards their presence as a stumbling-block is clearly judging religious discourse by external standards. But we should call a paradox what it is, viz. a self-contradiction. To show a scientist or a philosopher that what he says is self-contradictory is to refute him by showing that what he has said, when added together, equals zero. When Flew and Findlay and Martin say they detect the same sort of vacuity in talk about God's love or God's existence or God's manifestation in human

17. Among many recent writings on the freewill question which present this sort of solution, one should mention Chapter VI of G. E. Moore's *Ethics* (Home University Library), and the following articles: P. Nowell Smith, "Freewill and Moral Responsibility," *Mind*, 1948; the same author's "Determinists and Libertarians," *Mind*, 1954; F. V. Raab, "Free Will and the Ambiguity of 'Could'," *Philosophical Review* (January, 1955). This view is attacked in C. A. Campbell's "Is 'Freewill' a Pseudo Problem?" *Mind* (1951), and in W. I. Matson's "On the Irrelevance of Freewill to Moral Responsibility, and the Vacuity of the Latter," *Mind* (1956).

18. Martin's paper has led to several discussions in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, in which it first appeared. (See issues of August and December, 1955; May, 1956).

form, it would be a poor return for their pains to be told that in theology everything is different and that theologians can eat their cake and have it because they are cooking with very special ingredients. Perhaps this is all that can be said, but if so we are faced with a tragic and complete failure in communication. I would find this hard to credit; and I notice with interest that a volume of theological essays is appearing which will deal with some of these questions in contemporary terms.[19] Its authors are all from Oxford, where this kind of philosophy is dominant. I hope, however, that I have said enough to show that there is much of importance here for readers in this country also.

19. B. Mitchell (ed.), *Faith and Logic* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957).
Since this article was completed (February, 1957) this book has become available; there have also appeared several other books and a considerable number of articles dealing with the problems raised in the Flew-MacIntyre volume—in not a few cases the stimulus has been direct. Among the books I would mention the following: Alasdaire MacIntyre (ed.), *Metaphysical Beliefs* (London: SCM, 1957), reviewed in the *Canadian Journal of Theology*, January, 1958, Ian T. Ramsey, *Words and Images* (London: Longmans, 1957).
Among the papers: R. L. Franklin, "Necessary Being," and J. A. Passmore, "Christianity and Positivism" in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (August, 1957); H. J. N. Horsburgh, "The Claims of Religious Experience" (December issue); complete issue of *Philosophy* (July, 1957).
Finally, a very valuable little book, *The Nature of Metaphysics* (London: Macmillan, 1957), (ed. D. F Pears), contains a series of articles (originally B.B.C. talks) expounding the views of a group of Oxford philosophers on a topic I have been forced to pass over far too cursorily here.

The Atonement: Representative or Substitutionary?

G. B. MATHER

THE atonement is a central doctrine for Christians, but a hard doctrine upon which to agree. Particular difficulties beset the theory of a substitutionary atonement: some regard this as the keystone of evangelical doctrine, the *sine qua non* of authentic Christian faith and life; others consider it not only repulsive but immoral, a horrid aberration from the mind of Christ. This diversity of belief would be serious at any time. But in our own day it seems to be especially critical. The revival of concern for evangelism has led in some degree to a *rapprochement* between conservatives or fundamentalists on the one hand and liberals or "post-liberals" on the other hand. Billy Graham has served as the rallying-point of united efforts in evangelism, and a number of less conspicuous figures have performed a similar service. But this *rapprochement* can hardly fail to bring into focus points upon which a basic agreement is needed, and of these the substitutionary atonement is one of the most important issues.

This article is based upon the conviction that a union of forces in evangelism need be no mere "marriage of convenience." The writer belives that a fundamental unanimity is possible. What is proposed is a consideration of two theories having marked similarity, with the suggestion that they may be properly regarded as different emphases of the same fundamental truth.

The first theory is that of Vincent Taylor. It is set forth in his three works, *Jesus and His Sacrifice*, *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching*, and *Forgiveness and Reconciliation*. It deserves close attention. On the basis of a searching study of the scriptural evidence, Taylor maintains that the death of Christ was a sacrifice, not in a general sense, but closely linked with and deriving deep significance from the sacrifices of the religion of Israel. He gives a most adequate answer to a liberal interpretation such as that of Rashdall. However, he is deeply suspicious of the substitutionary theory because of what he regards as its crude, external, legalistic and mechanical nature. He offers instead the conception of a *representative* atonement. To the question, "*In what sense* did Christ die for men?" Taylor answers, "He died as their representative."

With respect to the representative sacrifice, as in other connections, Taylor regards the Old Testament background as of great importance. The fourth Servant Song (Isa. 53) might be selected as one passage that receives close scrutiny. Taylor sees the Servant accomplishing his destiny through suffering. "The Servant's suffering is not only his experience, but the achievement in which his supreme task consists."[1] It is to be especially emphasized that

1. *Jesus and His Sacrifice*, p. 40.

the suffering is representative. There is indeed a substitutionary element; not in the sense that healing comes to the recipients of divine grace through a simple transfer of punishment, but in the sense that the Servant bears the consequences of the sins of others. He is pierced on account of their rebellions and crushed on account of their sins. "Yahweh made to light on him the sins of us all" and "He bore the sins of many." But because of this the attitude of the onlookers, which at first was one of astonishment at his lowliness, becomes one of understanding, and through understanding leads to a recognition and confession of sin. "In this sense, they participate in the Servant's oblation and make it their own, and it is the complete act, including the Servant's offering and the onlookers' response, which constitutes the sacrifice presented to God. This inference is confirmed by the fact that it is only at the end, when both aspects have been described, that the poet declares that 'Yahweh was pleased to justify' His Servant."[2]

Taylor believes that there is an unmistakable connection between Isa. 53 and Jesus' "ransom" saying in Mark 10:45 and Mat. 20:28. Jesus does indeed use the term "Son of Man" which is not found in Isa. 53, but basic to the argument is the opinion that in the mind of Jesus the figure of the Son of Man had taken on the characteristics of the Suffering Servant, as indicated by Mark 8:31 and other passages. The words "for many" which occur at the end of the saying are suggested by the word "many," found three times in Isa. 53:11f (ERV). The phrase "to give himself" is strongly akin to the description of the Suffering Servant. The term "ransom" is not found in Isa. 53, but it is nevertheless an apt word to describe the function of the Servant who by a costly service for the many which they cannot render for themselves effects their deliverance.

Taylor admits a substitutionary element in the "ransom" passage. Both the Greek word *lutron* and the Hebrew words *kopher* and *kaphar* which lie behind it describe something which is counted as an equivalent for purposes of deliverance or redemption. "There is thus a definitely substitutionary idea in the terminology, although, of course, not one that is necessarily mechanical or which demands a theory of vicarious punishment."[3] We note here Taylor's opposition to the idea of a mechanical substitution, by which he means a totally objective process, and one that operates without human participation.

A similar thought is expressed when Taylor writes: "It is difficult, however, to escape the conviction that Jesus regarded His death as in some way an act of requittal."[4] He admits, further: "The idea that no act of requittal is due to a Holy God, or is needed by men, is a modern notion which it would be libel to attribute to the ancient world; and to say that Jesus cannot have spoken of His death in this way is to modernize His Figure and His thought. Jesus is a stranger to the thought-world of the twentieth century."[5] But in spite of the suggestion which such words contain, it must not be

2. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

thought that Jesus had in mind any mechanical or external process. An active spiritual participation, which is essential to all sacrifice, must have been in His thought.

The preposition *anti* in the phrase *anti pollōn* provides evidence of a substitutionary element. "This use of the rarer preposition, instead of what Moulton calls 'the more colourless' *hyper* can hardly be accidental, and its commonest meaning 'instead of' rather than 'on behalf of' is probably required in this passage."[6] Again Taylor warns against any "crudely substitutionary idea" and refers to the sense in which he finds the idea of substitution acceptable, namely an act done for the many which they cannot do for themselves.

Taylor finds the representative aspect strong in the Pauline epistles. It appears as an idea already familiar from primitive Christian preaching, but now attaining a new force and depth. He brings forth as evidence a number of passages, of which the clearest are probably the following:

> The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge that one died for all, *therefore all died* (2 Cor. 5:14).
> Him who knew no sin *he made to be sin on our behalf* (2 Cor. 5:21).
> Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, *having become a curse for us* (Gal. 3:13).[7]

Taylor tackles the difficult question which comes to the mind upon reading such passages: "How could the sinless Christ be said to have been 'made sin' or to have become 'a curse' for us?" His answer may be indicated in a quotation:

> It is evident that St. Paul believed that in some way, and in some representative way, Christ acted for men, and what happened to Him was of supreme moment for them. To this belief he attached great, indeed decisive, importance, and he made it one of the foundation principles of his teaching.[8]

To avoid further details, Taylor's theory may be summarized as follows: He believes that Jesus, drawing on Old Testament conceptions, especially those of the Son of Man and the Suffering Servant, and at the same time transforming them, gave a profound interpretation of His own sacrifice as representative and vicarious. The same aspects are presented repeatedly in the witness to Christ found throughout the New Testament. Christ has identified Himself with men, taken upon Himself the consequences of human sin and has presented to God on behalf of men a perfect offering of penitence and submission. The sacrifice is not substitutionary except in the sense that Christ does for men what they cannot do for themselves. Substitution in the sense of a transfer of guilt, an external or mechanical exchange expressive of a legal rather than an ethical and religious relationship, is to be definitely excluded.

Taylor's meticulous care in Biblical study is apparent. His conception of a representative atonement grows out of years of painstaking research, and

6. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
7. The italics in each case are Taylor's.
8. *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching*, p. 60.

must surely be regarded as well supported by evidence. It is also interesting to note his honesty in admitting evidence of a substitutionary atonement which he obviously finds trouble in working into his conclusions. There is a tension between Taylor the exegete and Taylor the theologian.

Leon Morris in *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross* covers much the same ground as Taylor. He shows a similar care in his investigation. But his approach is from the opposite direction. He accepts the substitutionary theory readily and gladly, but gives only brief and restrained recognition to the idea of representation.

A short statement of Morris's theory may concentrate upon his treatment of the "ransom" passage. Morris regards the Hebrew *kopher* as the background of the Greek *lutron*, and states: "The noun *kopher* means a ransom price, and upon every occasion on which it is used it can be shown that there is the thought of a payment to be made. In its biblical usage it refers to the sum paid to redeem a forfeited life."[9] He maintains that *lutron* bears the same meaning, quoting a remark of Procksch that: "As translation of *kopher* then, *lutron* always means a substitute-gift." Then he continues: "there is no occurrence of the word (*lutron*) in the LXX without a price being expressed or clearly implied. We can confidently say that, in so far as the New Testament writers were imbued with the LXX outlook, they must have had in their minds some idea of deliverance by payment of price when they used the words of this word group."[10]

Morris agrees with Taylor regarding the sense of *anti*. "The preposition *anti* characteristically has the meaning 'in the place of', 'instead of', whether in the classics or the *koinē*."[11]

Morris likewise parallels Taylor in his opinion of the place of *lutron* in Christ's saying. Both oppose Rashdall's contention that the *lutron* part of the passage cannot be authentic because it does not fit the context. Morris claims: "There seems no particular reason why our Lord should not have directed the attention of the disciples to the aspects of self-abnegation and of service to others which are seen in His death, and then have gone on to indicate also that the supreme service lay elsewhere."[12]

A detailed examination of the usage of the cognates of *lutron* reinforces the above conclusions.

With regard to St. Paul, Morris writes: "He found it necessary to bring in many categories to interpret what was done on Calvary, and it would seem impossible to escape the conclusion that substitution was one of them. The place and nature of the substitution may require careful definition, but that substitution is part of St. Paul's thought seems beyond reasonable doubt."[13]

9. *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross*, p. 19.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 58. Morris finds the idea of substitution in Eph. 1:7 (p. 38 ff.), Rom. 3:24 (p. 41 ff.), Col. 1:14 (p. 43). He believes it is implicit in 1 Cor. 1:30 (p. 45 ff.). He regards it is indubitable in Gal. 3:13 (p. 52 ff.).

Morris finds the idea of substitution in other Biblical terms than *lutron*, though none receive so detailed a study as the latter. He relates the idea of substitution to the covenant, to propitiation, to reconciliation and to justification. He appears unsure of an explicit relation with the covenant, and in the case of reconciliation he admits there is no very close connection. But he claims a definitely substitutionary emphasis in justification, and quotes Calvin, James Morison, F. W. Camfield, Karl Barth, H. Maurice Pelton, H. Wheeler Robinson and A. Schlatter in his support. He regards substitution as an objective element in the atonement. "Something happened on Calvary quite objective to men. . . . In the last resort it depends on what God has done, and not upon some effect of that action upon the human heart (which is not to deny that there is such an effect, and that it is important)."[14]

It is clear that Morris does not think of substitution in any merely mechanical or legalistic sense. Christ, as substitute, has become identified with men. "Then let us notice that there is more than one way of understanding substitution, and some ways are more worthy than others. . . . when we speak of substitution in connection with His death, we should bear in mind that He made Himself one with those for whom He suffered."[15]

At the end of the book Morris gives brief attention to the idea of representation. He writes: "there remains the further question of how we are to understand this objective factor, and in particular of whether we are to say that Christ's death was representative only, or that it was also substitutionary. That Christ died as our representative is widely recognized, but most scholars would affirm that there is no need of the substitutionary idea, all that is valuable in it being preserved in the concept of representation. . . . In the light of what has already been adduced it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the idea of substitution must be included in our understanding of the atonement."[16]

In short, Taylor emphasizes representation while giving a cautious and somewhat embarrassed recognition to substitution. Morris emphasizes substitution while taking only brief notice of representation.

But need there be hesitancy or embarrassment in either case? The present contention is that there need not: the two concepts, far from being exclusive, are in fact complementary; each presents a necessary aspect of the whole truth. The issue of representation and substitution hinges upon the problem: to what degree does the believer undergo the experience of Christ and reproduce His work? In so far as the experience and work of the believer are the same or similar, the sacrifice of Christ will be spoken on in terms of representation; in so far as they are different, it will be spoken of in terms of substitution. Representation emphasizes similarity; substitution emphasizes dissimilarity. But neither need be adopted to the exclusion of the other; they are two different aspects of the same relationship; each has its own contri-

14. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

bution to make to the complete picture of Christian truth; indeed, each guards against an aberration that is all too apt to arise when the other holds the field.

Since this claim is liable to arouse suspicion of syncretism it will be well to elaborate somewhat, in an attempt to show that the two theories do belong together. The objections commonly raised to each theory by itself should not be lightly passed over; they do not arise solely from the offence of the cross. Taylor speaks for many when he regards the substitutionary theory as crude, mechanical, legalistic or exclusively objective; and it is of interest that he raises these objections even while setting forth the evidence for substitution. His representative theory is an attempt to overcome the objectionable features he sees in the substitutionary theory. Christ, he believes, by virtue of His perfect humanity and the completeness of his identification with men made possible a vital participation on the part of men. The bonds by which He is united with men are the most intimate that can be imagined. He is the perfect representative. The saving benefits of His work await only the act whereby men make His offering their own.

But once this vital participation is acknowledged the idea of substitution becomes purged of its objectionable features. We may go on to recognize that Christ has done for men what they cannot do for themselves, indeed that He has undergone an experience into the depths of which they need not enter. It is true that, as the believer advances in the life of faith and becomes a mature Christian, he will feel more poignantly both the suffering of Christ and the sin of men; in his witness to Christ he may have to experience persecution and may even become a martyr. But nevertheless there is an experience he does not need to know, a pain which he is not required to endure. That is the bitterness of death which Christ experienced, the extra weight which hung upon His soul, the ultimate sense of desolation that He knew before His physical life had come to a close.

The cry of dereliction from the cross points to the same conclusion. In this expression of anguish, which has so perplexed interpreters, man catches a glimpse of an infinite depth of suffering. The exact nature of the experience is not known, nor does it need to be known. Into it the Christian is not called to enter in any exact or complete sense. However sharp and severe may be the task of discipleship, however much the sense of discouragement may at times close around the Christian, he at least need never believe himself forsaken by God.

This realization throws light upon a problem that has confronted some: How can one explain the fact of Christ's fearful shrinking from the Cross when the martyrs of the faith have often gone to deaths physically just as painful, or perhaps more painful, with songs of praise upon their lips? Surely the answer must be that there was a dimension of pain which He experienced but the martyrs did not. Beyond the physical and mental distress which such a death would bring to anyone lay a spiritual experience of desolation and loneliness that brought it to an ultimate pitch. This believers have

not been called to endure. If it should be said that in the act of contemplating it the Christian enters into it, the reply must be made that even then he does not really know it. This consideration does, however, bring to mind the truth that an experience into which a person enters may still be beyond him, according to the aspect from which it is viewed, and that therefore representation and substitution are not mutually exclusive categories. It is impossible to disentangle the two ideas with exactitude. This, however, is not serious. Regarding them as different aspects of the same reality leaves one free to contemplate either without any self-contradiction.

Morris comes close to this conception when he writes:

"The substitution which results is not the substitution of a casual stranger, but of one who stands in the closest possible relationship with those for whom He died."[17]

There is one further point to be noted from the angle of Christian experience. It has been remarked that one of the advantages of the representative theory is that it guards against a passive conception of faith. It is equally true, however, that one can be misled by a purely active conception. It is possible for activity to become a source of pride, and for discipleship to be regarded as in some sense a personal attainment. The doctrine of substitutionary sacrifice guards against this. The message that Christ suffered, not only for sins, but in the sinner's place, attacks pride in a most subtle form, and drives home with a kind of ultimate intensity the truth that for his salvation the believer is dependent upon a work that is not his own.

It can be readily admitted that the preaching of a substitutionary atonement has been subject to abuse. The cause of the trouble is that the substitutionary idea has in some quarters held the field too exclusively, unaccompanied by other elements of truth. For some the atonement has scarcely been regarded in any other light. The solution lies, therefore, in the maintenance of a proper perspective and proportion that disregards neither the representative aspect nor the substitutionary aspect of our Lord's atoning work.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

The Macdonnell Heresy Trial

JOSEPH C. McLELLAND

IT was September, 1875—just three months after the great union of all Presbyterian Church groups in the young Dominion of Canada. The Union had been consummated only after debate and with misgiving regarding its survival. Could Free Church and Established Church share a common creed and courts? Would not the liberal bent of the Auld Kirk mean the end of true confessionalism? Such were the questions being asked throughout the nation. And in that month of September a quiet, scholarly voice from the pulpit of St. Andrew's Church in Toronto brought them into focus and provided the first testing of the Union.

In those days the theological world—and that was the whole world!—discoursed much about Eschatology, in the traditional sense of chronological "last things" and the eternal things after the last.[1] The problem of the duration of punishment after death was the subject of a sermon (subsequently entitled "Universalism") which the noted preacher, the Reverend D. J. Macdonnell delivered on that fateful day. Touching lightly but definitely on the position of the Westminster Confession of Faith (the subordinate standard of the new Presbyterian Church in Canada, adopted officially just three months before), Macdonnell suggested that this might not be the last word on the subject. Thereafter things moved quickly—newspaper reports and ecclesiastical debate and proceedings gathered momentum in a young Church and a young nation more alive to basic issues of beliefs and standards than they are today. Two things in particular are noteworthy—the calm deliberation of the central figure and the patience of a supreme Church Court seeking the truth in love.

Macdonnell, the Man[2]

The Reverend George Macdonnell, Minister of the Church of Scotland at Bathurst, N.B., was blessed with a son on January 15, 1843, naming him Daniel James. Raised in the manses of Bathurst, Waterdown and Fergus, D. J. Macdonnell early showed his ability as a scholar, and after graduating

1. This could be illustrated from the theology of any area during the period of Macdonnell's life, but perhaps best from our own Canadian scene. In 1886 a book of over 500 pages was published by Dr. Wm. Cochrane, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada in 1882, on the subject "Future Punishment; or Does Death end Probation?" Its topics include Materialism, Conditional Immortality or Annihilationism, Restorationism or Universalism, Optimism or Eternal Hope, Probationism and Purgatory. Special Chapters were written by Professor McClaren of Knox College and Archbishop Lynch of Toronto, among others. In his Preface the author states, "In Canada and the United States, the pulpit was never more definite and outspoken regarding the Doctrine of Eternal Punishment than at the present moment."

2. The very detailed biography by Macdonnell's friend, Professor McCurdy, provides ample materials, with sermons and prayers as appendices. *Life and Work of D. J. Macdonnell*, by J. F. McCurdy (Briggs, 1879).

from Queen's, went to Glasgow in 1863 to study theology. He had met the subject at Queen's, where Butler's *Analogy* was the chief text, and now spent three years at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Berlin, meeting the new critical theology which later caused him such trial.

Writing from Berlin to his brother George, he indicates his doubts on the subject of subordinate standards:

I suppose that most people admit that there must be a little latitude allowed in signing the Confession of Faith, and that one is hardly expected to assent to every clause absolutely; but the question comes to be, how far this latitude is to be allowed to extend. I am inclined to think that confessions, as we are required to subscribe to them, do more harm than good—that they torment conscientious men, while they do not keep out of the Church careless men, who do not care much what they sign . . . If any means could be devised of securing *piety* in intending ministers, it would be much more to the purpose, and orthodoxy on many points might be left to take care of itself. Without the piety, the orthodoxy is worse than useless.[3]

Ordained in Edinburgh in 1866, he was called to St. Andrew's, Peterborough, and inducted on November 20. Now he is able to confess to George:

It is a great thing to have definite, practical work to do—it prevents too much speculation, which is for me, at least, not a desirable thing.

Four years later, on the occasion of his call to St. Andrew's, Toronto, Macdonnell voiced his difficulties before the Presbytery of Toronto. The sympathetic counsel of the Fathers and Brethren "helped him to reach ground whereon he could stand."[4] He was therefore inducted on December 22, 1870, into a ministry which involved the building of a new Church (the present edifice at King and Simcoe Streets), a Manse and the Institute. His Scots congregation became a centre of wide influence and of strong witness throughout the City.[5]

The Sermon

On September 26, 1875, two budding journalists attended the morning service at St. Andrew's, Toronto, whose Minister was noted as one who tested the shorthand skill of the best of newspapermen. One of the young men, Toronto correspondent of the Montreal *Witness*, thought the sermon worthy of publication, and his summary appeared in the Monday edition. Some ten days later, Mr. Macdonnell had occasion to speak at the opening exercises of Knox College, as a member of its Senate. The Toronto *Mail* of October 7 reports:

He likened the various denominations to rays of light of various colours which required to be merged into one another to make a pure white ray . . . He liked

3. McCurdy, p. 37.
4. McCurdy, p. 63.
5. Cf. *The Book of St. Andrew's*, A Short History of St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church, Toronto, by Stuart C. Parker, published by the Centenary Committee of the Congregation, 1930.

Presbyterianism and Presbyterian teaching. He liked its Confession of Faith, because of its tolerance . . . He could not help thinking that the men who composed that creed would rather that it was not in existence, if they could have foreseen individual members of the Church exalting the document in a way that they never intended . . . He did not believe that any one of the Professors occupying Chairs in the College regarded Presbyterianism as a finality . . . It was quite right for people to know the Confession of Faith, but they should keep it subordinate to the Word of God, and not look upon it as if it were infallible.

Two fellow-Presbyters took issue with his remarks, and in turn Macdonnell's friends in Montreal demanded justice. Accordingly, the full text of the Sermon (as compiled by the newspapermen) was printed on October 12 under the title, "Universal Salvation." The Toronto *Mail*'s account was headed more cautiously, "The Hereafter," while the *Globe* contented itself with the banner "Report of the Sermon." On November 5 the Presbytery of Toronto appointed a special Committee to confer with Macdonnell, and the ecclesiastical process began.

In the sermon,[6] based on Romans 5:12–21, Macdonnell deals with the relationship of Adam to Christ and the meaning of the terms sin, death, grace, righteousness and life. The explanations of how we get sin from Adam and righteousness from Christ are said to be "human interpretations of the Divine record"—Pelagian, Augustinian, Federal and Arminian theories. The Westminster Confession seems the most reasonable, and is a combination of Augustinian and Federal views. After quoting the Confession, Macdonnell comments:

This is a human account of the matter—it is not Gospel truth. It is as good an account as any philosopher that I have ever read anything of can yet give—for this is a matter for the philosopher as well as for the theologian. It is not started by the Bible; it is started by man's conscience.

He notes that the phrases in Romans 5 seem to teach universal salvation:

The passage seems to say, as clearly as human language can say it, that the justification is co-extensive with the judgment; that the sanctification is co-extensive with the sin . . . Plain men reading these words without any theology in their heads will say that it means that all men who became sinners through Adam, are to be made holy through Christ; candidly, this is what it does mean . . . Here is the question: can God, through all eternity, look complacently upon not only the misery but the sin of the lost? Is sin stronger than God? Is evil co-existent and co-eternal with the good? These are the questions. I don't say no to them, and I won't say yes, because if that is the case you see you have two Gods, and the evil God is just as the good God.[7]

6. No full text is available—Mr. Macdonnell was not in the habit of reading his sermons, and did not issue an authentic text at any time. McCurdy does not give the newspaper account, but this is extant in the Toronto *Globe* and in the bound papers of the Synod of Toronto and Kingston "for use of Parties and General Assembly," 1876 [Paper J (1), p. 34].

7. At the Presbytery meeting following, Principal Caven observed that Macdonnell *should* have said "no" to the questions. Nevertheless his problem here is no new superficial one: Augustine himself struggled out of Manichaeism on just such grounds.

There are statements in Scripture (such as Matt. 12:32, Mark 9:43, 2 Thess. 1:9) that seem "almost to shut out the belief of anything but eternal misery, eternal punishment," while against these can be urged other scriptural passages (Romans 11:32, I Cor. 15:22, Phil. 2:9f, Eph. 1:10 and Col. 1:19). This divergence suggests that the teaching of Scripture is "not clear and unmistakable on this point," as the Confession of Faith claims. The matter should therefore be left "an open question for further investigation . . . I sympathize intensely with those words of Tennyson,

> 'Oh, yet we trust that somehow good
> Will be the final goal of ill'."[8]

Macdonnell's conclusion is reported as follows:

I think the Christian Church, instead of putting into its Confessions of Faith that there is to be eternal punishment for the majority of the human race, would be wiser to sit down in a devout posture and study Romans and Ephesians and Colossians . . . I am not bound by the Confession of Faith when it conflicts with the Bible, as you know . . . I have no sympathy, and I hope none of you have, with a kind of universalism which is a good deal preached now—that which abolishes the distinction between sin and righteousness. If there is universal salvation taught in the Bible, it is not that a man can go on sinning all his life. The question is not, is there a hell—for there is; it is not about punishment, but about the eternity of it. It is not the question of suffering for our sins beyond the grave, for we shall suffer just as surely as we go to bed tonight. But there is nothing dangerous in telling poor sinners that men will have a chance to gain life beyond the grave . . . there are more astonishing passages, and passages full of glorious truth, that declare that at some time or other death, spiritual and carnal, shall be eternally done away; that all enemies shall be subdued to Christ, and 'every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess that He is Lord, to the glory of God the Father; and God shall be all in all'.

The Trial

1. The Presbytery

A *pro re nata* meeting of the Presbytery of Toronto on November 4 was called by the Moderator, Dr. Topp, on receipt of a requisition signed by eleven members of Presbytery, for a meeting "to take into consideration the doctrine of a sermon said to have been preached by the Rev. D. J. Macdonnell in St. Andrew's Church on the 26th ult., and what action may be necessary thereanent." Principal Caven of Knox College opened the discussion, asking whether the published account reported the sermon correctly. Macdonnell replied in the affirmative, except that certain alterations and omissions gave the general effect

that I declared my acceptance of the doctrine of the final restoration of all, and denied the eternity of future punishment, whereas I simply stated the difficulty I had in arriving at any conclusion, inasmuch as the teaching of Scripture appeared to be conflicting . . . Moreover, I found that some of the best of

8. Mr. Macdonnell's mother, when discussing the sermon later, commented on his use of Tennyson: "It's all very well for *him* to say those things—*he* was only a poet–"

modern commentators, such as Tholuck, Lange and Olhausen, who have done noble service to the cause of Bible truth, and who are looked upon as safe guides in the interpretation of Scripture, favour more or less distinctly the view of restoration; one does not feel that in such company he can be so very far astray.[9]

As to the Confession of Faith, Macdonnell thought that if this were being framed today, the resultant document would contain "fewer propositions" and "more room for difference of opinion." Moreover,

Most men will likewise admit that the Church has the right to revise and amend her Confession from time to time. It might have been better for the Presbyterian Church had there been a periodical revision and curtailing of the Confession.[10]

After a Committee had met with Mr. Macdonnell, it was able to report to Presbytery his expression of regret at speaking "in a way not in harmony with the Confession," and his engagement not to contravene its teaching in his public ministry while seeking further light. Presbytery unanimously adopted the Committee's recommendation:

That the Presbytery, taking the premisses into consideration, agrees that time be granted to Mr. Macdonnell to consider more carefully the question involved, in the hope that his views may seen be brought into complete harmony with those of the church. But the Presbytery, recognizing the fundamental importance of the doctrine of future punishment as taught in the Confession of Faith, and the necessity of maintaining in its integrity the church's testimony thereto, requires Mr. Macdonnell to report to this court as to his argument with the teaching of the Confession on the doctrine in question not later than the last regular meeting before the next General Assembly.

Thus it was that Mr. Macdonnell submitted to the April meeting of Presbytery the first of a long series of statements:[11]

Fathers and Brethren . . . In accordance with the terms of said resolution, I desire now to submit the following statement:

9. Macdonnell later explicitly denied a doctrine of restorationism. It is strange that he does not mention Dorner, of whom he wrote during his residence in Germany as a student, "Dorner, among the theological professors, pleases me best, though he is sometimes very cloudy" (McCurdy, p. 26). Tholuck and Dorner were two outstanding representatives of the "Liberal Evangelical" school which followed Schleiermacher. Among their tenets were two that must have influenced Macdonnell during his year in their classrooms: that diversity in theological opinion is not necessarily ground for breaking fellowship; and that in eschatology, there is opportunity for repentance and faith in the future life. Thus Dorner writes (*A System of Christian Doctrine*, Vol. IV, Clark, 1882): "The gospel will be brought decisively home to all who did not in this world come to definitive decision, and all who do not shut themselves thereto will be saved" (p. 412); The word *aiōnios* means eternal duration with respect to blessedness but "by no means denotes everywhere an endless period, for an end of the aeons is spoken of" (p. 419); after considering restorationism and annihilationism, he concludes: "We must be content with saying, that the ultimate fate of individuals remains veiled in mystery, as well as whether all will attain the blessed goal or not" (p. 427).

10. Macdonnell would have been pleased with the present terms of reference of the Committee on Articles of Faith of the Presbyterian Church in Canada: "for the purpose of re-examining our whole confessional position as a Church, with a view eventually to stating what we believe, as a Reformed Church, in language and concepts relevant to our day and situation" (A. and P. of the 1957 General Assembly, p. 226). (His great-nephew, the Rev. Scarth Macdonnell, is its Chairman.)

11. Synod Papers, E; *cf. British American Presbyterian*, April 28, 1876.

1. So far as the language of the Confession of Faith on this point is concerned, I find that it is almost entirely borrowed from Scripture, and I declare my adhesion to it, understanding the phrase "eternal torments" to have the same meaning as "everlasting punishment" in Matthew xxv. 2.

2. While I do not consider myself debarred by the teaching of Scripture from *hoping* that God may in some way put an end to sin and suffering, I am satisfied that it is not a part of the message with which I am entrusted as a minister of the gospel, to hold out any hope of future pardon, to those who have in this life rejected Christ. "Now is the accepted time." What God *may* do hereafter is apparently not among the things revealed or intended to be known.

I hope that this statement may prove satisfactory. I am, Fathers and Brethren, Yours respectfully, D. J. Macdonnell.

The friend and supporter of Mr. Macdonnell, David Mitchell, moved that this statement be accepted "as a sufficient response to the requirement" of Presbytery. But an amendment of Prof. McLaren's prevailed, that a Committee should again consider the matter and report to a later meeting.

The work of this Committee, convened by Prof. McLaren and including Mr. David Mitchell and Principal Caven, constitutes the chief theological critique of Macdonnell's position, and will be noted at length. To its meeting on April 17 Macdonnell had presented some Notes, at the Committee's request.

1. I substitute the words 'everlasting punishment', or rather the Greek words *kolasin aiōnion* (Matt. xxv. 46) for 'eternal torments', because the former is in Scripture applied to the punishment of wicked men and the latter is not. There is an obvious distinction between 'punishment' and 'torments'.
2. The word *aiōnios* may, of course, mean *absolutely endless*. I do not deny that there is strong ground for assigning to it that meaning in the passage quoted. But it has often in Scripture a more limited signification, and if there is room for even a shadow of doubt as to whether the Saviour intended to teach that evil would be endless, there is room to 'hope', however vaguely, that God may in some way put an end to sin and suffering.[12]

The Committee reported to Presbytery that "Mr. Macdonnell's paper, without accepting the doctrine of future punishment as taught in the Confession of Faith, declares a qualified adhesion to the language in which it is embodied." Three questions concerning Macdonnell's statement, in the light of his Notes and verbal comments, guided the debate. (1) Does the Statement embody views which Presbytery can accept as satisfactory? (2) If there is deviation from the received doctrine of the Church, is it "of such

12. Macdonnell's comments are far from being superficial. In the verse at issue, Matthew 25:46, the two phrases are apparently parallel: "everlasting punishment—everlasting life." However, the word rendered "punishment" (*kolasin*) comes from the root "pruning", and suggests corrective rather than vindictive punishment. Moreover, the key term *aiōnios* means "age-long" (belonging to the aeon) rather than "endless." Modern research has recovered the apocalyptic doctrine of the Two Ages, which is a thoroughly Biblical idea, yet would interpret this to mean that the *aiōnios* of the Coming Age partakes of the divine "everlastingness." E.g. Kittel's *Wörterbuch z. N.T.* (Vol. I, pp. 197–209) deals with *aion* in terms of *Ewigkeit* and *Weltzeit*, but in regard to *aiōnios* in Matthew 25:46 stresses the primary meaning of "never stopping, endless" (*zunächst nur niemals aufhörend, endlos*). As Macdonnell later pointed out, the argument does not stand or fall with one word!

a nature as can be tolerated in one holding the office of a gospel minister?" (3) What action should Presbytery take?

The first point is that only the *duration* of future punishment is in question. It is "a punishment which is of limited duration," and this view is unsatisfactory, for it deviates from "the well understood and historical meaning." This is why Macdonnell feels bound to explain Matthew xxv as he does—he accepts the Confession's teaching only as its language coincides with "the manner in which he is accustomed to construe Scripture." Indeed, "few Universalists would object to the eternity of future punishments, if they were only allowed to understand eternal punishments as having the same meaning as they attach to 'everlasting punishment' in Matthew xxv." From the concluding part of his statement, Mr. Macdonnell evidently understands "everlasting punishment" in a sense not traditional or "in its ordinary meaning," but "as equivalent to a meaning which it is assumed the original Greek *aiōnion* may bear." Since Mr. Macdonnell confirmed this view of the Statement, there is no doubt that it "covers and was intended to cover a deviation from the doctrine of the Confession of Faith and the Creeds of Christendom and from what your Committee believes is the teaching of the Holy Scriptures."

Presbytery adopted this finding on the first Question on motion of Principal Caven, and proceeded to the second: is the deviation intolerable in a Minister of the Gospel? Since the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked is Scriptural—not by one phrase but by "a great variety of representations"—the Committee declared that this is not one of "those minor deviations from the truth which the Presbytery is at liberty to overlook." It weakens the sanctions of God's law and the "power of those appeals by which the gospel is urged upon men." Mr. Macdonnell's position is "inconsistent with the acceptance of the integrity of that system of doctrine which is embodied in the standards of the Presbyterian Church in Canada," nor is a subordinate Court of the Church competent "to entertain the question of granting, by their own authority, a relaxation of the terms of Ministerial Communion."

Consideration was deferred until the third Question could be discussed, as to what action was necessary. Another Committee was appointed, "with a view of ascertaining whether there is any prospect of his sentiments being brought into harmony with those of the Church." Prof. McLaren was named Convener, with Principal Caven, Dr. Carmichael of King, David Mitchell and others as members. After consultation with Macdonnell, they asked permission to sit again. This was granted, and Presbytery adjourned to meet on May 2. The time was shortening, since Synod was to meet on May 4th and the General Assembly on June 8.

Meanwhile, the press appears quite confused about things. On April 7 the *British American Presbyterian* reported happily that Mr. Macdonnell "seems to have succeeded in dispelling the mist which surrounded him some time ago"—news "most gratifying to the rev. gentleman's many friends in

this city and throughout the country." But the Toronto *Mail* made editorial comment about a more sinister aspect of the entire proceedings: "It is not pleasant to think of, but it is a fact that has already provoked much comment, that in the Toronto Presbytery the dividing lines between those for and those against Mr. Macdonnell have very nearly coincided with those between the two Churches lately united. Evidently church union has its drawbacks as well as its advantages; and evidently, too, the strengthening of Christian charity and brotherly forbearance is not among the latter."

The Committee worked hard, despite many problems. On one occasion a mistake of the messenger who carried the notice of meeting caused a wait of one hour and then adjournment. A sub-committee of McLaren, Caven and J. M. King (later Principal of Manitoba College) dealt with a new statement submitted by Macdonnell. This runs in part as follows:[13]

> The doctrine of the eternity of punishment is still to my mind involved in great difficulties, arising partly from certain texts of Scripture, the most obvious interpretation of which seems to be that sin shall at some time or other close, and partly from general considerations of the character of God, as revealed, of His infinite righteousness, in all His moral creatures; His infinite wisdom, whose plans cannot be baffled; His mercy, which endureth forever—considerations, which, taken by themselves, would form a ground for hope that God would find out some way of putting an end to sin and suffering.
>
> On the other hand there is one way of deliverance, and one only, pointed out, and concerning those who reject this way there are awfully severe statements, especially from the lips of Christ Himself, which seem to shut the door of hope, and which lead me to say that I do not consider it a part of my message as a Minister of the Gospel, to hold out the hope of future pardon, to those who deliberately reject Christ.
>
> I have arrived at no conclusion at variance with the doctrine of the Church. I do not conceal that I have some doubt whether the Church is absolutely correct in her interpretation of the statements of Scripture referred to; but I admit that they point with almost irresistible force in the direction of the endless punishment of the wicked. I have no intention of making this doubt a part of my preaching.
>
> Having made these statements, I have no difficulty in declaring my adhesion to the teachings of the Confession of Faith on this point, the more especially as the language used is almost entirely borrowed from Scripture.
>
> I am, yours respectfully,
>
> D. J. Macdonnell

The Synod meeting sisted procedure at the Presbytery level. A dissent of D. Mitchell and W. Mitchell from the action of the Presbytery of Toronto, on the grounds that Mr. Macdonnell had answered satisfactorily the requirements of Presbytery, came before Synod of Toronto and Kingston. Agreeing that it had insufficient time to deal with this matter, the Court transmitted *simpliciter* to the General Assembly the "Dissent and Complaint, Mitchell *et al.* against the Presbytery of Toronto."

13. Synod Papers, I, pp. 31 f.

In the brief period left to it, Presbytery resumed its struggle with Macdonnell's doubts. On May 30 it accepted his final statement, resolving to transmit it to the Assembly, along with an expression of hope that it might be found "a satisfactory basis for the settlement of the case," and requesting the Assembly to issue in the matter. The statement reads,

> Notwithstanding difficulties which I have regarding the eternity of future punishment, I continue my adhesion to that doctrine, as implied in my assent to the Confession of Faith formerly given.

2. The General Assembly

Meeting in Knox Church, Toronto, from June 8 to 23, 1876, the Second General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada considered the Dissent and Complaint at its Eighth Sederunt.[14] Mr. Mitchell "craved leave to fall from his complaint." All parties being agreeable, permission was granted and Assembly proceeded directly to deal with the reference from the Presbytery of Toronto.

Principal Caven and J. M. King presented the case to Assembly, but were judged by Macdonnell himself to have spoken too favorably in his behalf. His qualifications prevented any speedy issuance of the matter, and now began a debate during nine sederunts which produced, among other notable items, over twelve amendments (nine surviving until the vote was taken).

Macdonnell's own speech[15] explicitly rejected doctrines of restorationism and annihilationism. He sought rather a reconciliation of varying Scriptural emphases, by applying the limited use which the word *aiōnios* enjoyed elsewhere to its use in Matthew 25. Yet he recognized that "the whole question did not turn on the meaning of the word." His point was that the Westminster Confession does not answer the question, but finds it "more reverent to use the language of Scripture than to define what was undefinable in human language." He appealed to the order of questions put to an Ordinand, in which Scripture alone was supreme, the question about adherence to the Confession being a weaker one.

The debate was interrupted by two periods of Committee meetings with Macdonnell, and reached its climax at 11.00 p.m. on June 16. Ten different possibilities were open to the Assembly, based on an original motion of Dr. Cochrane of Brantford. Principal McVicar's amendment finally prevailed in the voting by 263 to 101. Ninety-six commissioners recorded their dissent. The motion as amended read:

> That this Assembly sustain the reference for judgment, and find that in the statement made before this Assembly, Mr. Macdonnell has declared that he does not hold the doctrine of everlasting punishment in the sense held by the Church and formulated by the Confession of Faith; nevertheless, that he has adopted no doctrinal views contrary to the Confession of Faith; therefore

14. The Acts and Proceedings of the Second General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, Toronto, 1876.
15. McCurdy, pp. 101–114.

Resolved,—First, that the above twofold statement is not satisfactory to this Assembly; Second, that a Committee be appointed to confer with Mr. Macdonnell, in the hope that they may be able to bring in a report as to Mr. Macdonell's views which may be satisfactory to this Assembly.

Macdonnell immediately requested that the matter be remitted to his own Presbytery "to proceed regularly by libel"; but the Assembly reasoned that it must fulfil its own decision.

The special Committee's report was anti-climactic. It asked for more time for Macdonnell to resolve his doubts since his attitude was "one of *doubt*, as distinguished from belief on the one hand, and denial on the other," according to its Answers to Dissent. The motion read that Macdonnell was to report to the next Assembly through his Presbytery, "whether he accepted the teaching of the Church on the subject." Again the accused requested that his presbytery be granted permission to proceed by libel; again the request was refused. Macdonnell's Auld Kirk tradition of the sovereign right of the Court of Presbytery—along with his insistence that a regular charge be brought—was thus overruled as the Assembly sought to deal less formally with its erring child.

So began a year of self-searching, of countless conversations, of hundreds of letters and dozens of books received from friends and foes. Yet when the Assembly met again, at Halifax in June, 1877, he had reached no new decision, and reported simply that he held no opinion at variance with the teaching of the Church on the eternity of future punishment. This was deemed insufficient, and Dr. Topp, the past Moderator, moved that "a categorical answer" be prepared for a fixed date. Prof. Mackerras, joint-Clerk of the Assembly, held that this motion went beyond the stage reached in the Presbytery and was therefore *ultra vires*. This appeal to Established Church principle was outvoted by 174 to 82, and Macdonnell was given forty-eight hours to answer.

He could not comply. A motion instructing his Presbytery to serve a libel upon him was brought before the Court. Principal Caven led the opposition, and through amendment and counter-amendment the debate proceeded. At last Dr. Cochrane secured the position, on an amendment to refer to yet another special Committee. This was to be the last of Macdonnell's many meetings with committees. To all three of its suggested statements he gave his assent, which was presented to Assembly in the following terms:

I consider myself as under subscription to the Confession of Faith in accordance with my ordination vows, and I therefore adhere to the teaching of the Church as contained therein on the doctrine of the eternity or endless duration of the future punishment of the wicked, notwithstanding doubts or difficulties which perplex my mind.

A standing vote proved unanimous; the days of tension gave place to an hour of excited elation; and the Assembly joined in the Psalm:

Pray that Jerusalem may have
Peace and felicity . . .

Postlude of Piety

After the Trial, Macdonnell was free to pursue that "piety" or doing of the truth which he considered of higher value than subscription to theological creeds. His work on behalf of the Augmentation Plan of the national Church, as well as his civic and congregational interests and labours, form an unforgettable chapter in the history of Canadian Church and society alike. This is not our story here, but is one well worth knowing—the part that St. Andrew's played in such pioneer experiments as the Penny Banks, the "Nelson St. Institute," and the formation of the Forty-Eighth Highlanders, whose first Chaplain was D. J. Macdonnell.

In the year 1889, Macdonnell had occasion to comment further on what had been the most critical issue in his life. On March 3 he preached a sermon entitled "Death Abolished," in connection with the decease of his close friend George Paxton Young, LL.D., Professor of Logic, Metaphysics and Ethics in University College, Toronto. Paying tribute to the remarkable qualities of Professor Young, Macdonnell said:

> It was his inability to give to the Westminster Confession the sort of assent which was expected by the Church that led to his resignation of his position in Knox College, and, subsequently, to his withdrawal from the ministry of the Presbyterian Church.[16]

Then Macdonnell quoted some verses (omitted from the version in *The Book of Praise*!) from Whittier's 'The Eternal Goodness', a favorite of Young's. Among them are the stanzas:

I trace your lines of argument;
Your logic linked and strong
I weigh as one who dreads dissent
And fears a doubt as wrong.

But still my human hands are weak
To hold your iron creeds:
Against the words ye bid me speak
My heart within me pleads.

Who fathoms the Eternal Thought?
Who talks of scheme and plan?
The Lord is God! He needeth not
The poor device of man.

I walk with bare, hushed feet the ground
Ye tread with boldness shod;
I dare not fix with mete and bound
The love and power of God.

Who can doubt that the preacher that day was describing his own experience as well as his friend's?

Two days after this sermon, at the Presbytery meeting, he submitted a Notice of Motion which he failed to carry at the April meeting:

16. The sermon is given in full in McCurdy, pp. 474–489.

Whereas, the Church of Christ should be careful not to exclude from the ministry any man whom the Lord of the Church would receive; and
Whereas, the desired union of the several branches of the Church would necessarily involve the adoption of a common standard for a admission to the ministry; and
Whereas, the present terms of subscription in the Presbyterian Church of Canada have the effect of excluding from the ministry men who are acknowledged to be true ministers of the Gospel in other branches of the Church;
It is humbly overtured to the venerable the General Assembly to take such steps as it may deem best in the premises, in the way of altering the relation of ministers to the Confession of Faith, or of substituting for said Confession some briefer statement of the truths which are considered vital.[17]

The resolution lingered through later meetings of Presbytery in other forms, and was never finally rejected; but Macdonnell did not press the point.

The story of the man continues until his last illness during the years 1895–6, when he sought his favorite 'haven of rest', at Fergus, Ontario. Staying not at his former home, St. Andrew's Manse, but at the old Free Church Manse, 'Kirkhall', where his wife had been born, he fought a losing battle with the disease that brought his untimely death. This one chapter we have described was the most notable of his life, for it formed the clearest expression of his life-long conviction and of his deepest principles. His clash with the terms of subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith arose from his emphasis on "piety" as greater than "orthodoxy," and from his understanding that the human mind is not sufficient for the deep things of God. The stature of the man may be judged from the closing words of his last pastoral letter to his congregation, written from his sickbed:

What the coming years will bring, which of us can tell? The future is in the hands of Him who sees the end from the beginning, and whose name is Love. 'The Lord hath been mindful of us; he will bless us!'
'The Lord bless you, and keep you: the Lord make his face to shine upon you, and be gracious unto you: the Lord lift up his countenance upon you, and give you peace!

Yours faithfully,

FERGUS, December, 1895 D. J. Macdonnell

17. McCurdy, ch. 27, 'Question of the Confession'. I wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Mrs. W. L. Findlay, now of Kirkhall, Fergus, a daughter of D. J. Macdonnell, who graciously assisted in my research. Thanks are due also to my friend, Professor A. L. Farris of Knox College, Toronto, who suggested this line of research as relevant to contemporary Presbyterian work in revising the Ordination vows in regard to subordinate standards.

Man in Revolt: A Study in the Primaeval History of the Book of Genesis

CARMINO J. DE CATANZARO

IT is commonly accepted, in the light of literary and historical criticism, that much of the material of the book of Genesis is mythological. Archaeological discovery and the decipherment of ancient scripts have made available similar materials from Egypt and Mesopotamia, as well as from the ancient Canaanite city of Ugarit, some of which have shed valuable light on the biblical parallels.

Such mythological material is particularly abundant in the first eleven chapters, the Primaeval History. Its purpose is, in part, that of filling in a gap by relating the origins of things in symbolic form where the authors lacked more precise, scientific information. This interest in origins appears to have played an important part in the formation of the Pentateuch. The whole Pentateuch may be regarded as a story of the origins of Israel, of its religion, and of its Law. According to von Rad, its form is due to the crystallization of oral tradition around a credal scheme comprising the Exodus, the Lawgiving, and the Entry into Canaan, all of which are explained by the promise to the Patriarchs.[1] He views the Primaeval History as having been prefixed to the original material by the first literary author, and composed by him out of various oral materials which he was the first to assemble.[2] This further study of origins, the beginnings of the world, of mankind, of civilization, was intended by this author to provide a wider background for the other stories of origins.

The literary composition of the Primaeval History is considerably simpler than that of many other parts of Genesis. Two strata only, the earliest and the latest, J and P, are represented in it. Some scholars have attempted to demonstrate the presence of matter from other strata such as E within these chapters,[3] while others have alleged the compositeness of J[4] or of P[5] or of both, but such theories are, at least in the opinion of this writer, not entirely

1. See particularly his *Das formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuchs. Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom alten und neuen Testament*, Folge IV, Heft 26, (Stuttgart, 1938).

2. *Das erste Buch Mose*, in *Das Alte Testament Deutsch*, Bd. 2 (Göttingen, 1953), pp. 15 ff.

3. Cf. Mowinckel, *The Two Sources of the Predeuteronomic Primeval History (JE) in Genesis 1–11* (Oslo, 1937); Hölscher, *Geschichtsschreibung in Israel* (Lund, 1952).

4. Beginning with Budde, *Die biblische Urgeschichte* (Giessen, 1883); for more recent examples see Gunkel, *Genesis*, in the *Göttinger Handkommentar* (5th ed., Göttingen, 1922), and Simpson, *The Early Traditions of Israel* (Oxford, 1948), the latter of which modifies the theory by postulating extensive glosses on the original source documents before they were combined.

5. Cf. von Rad, *Die Priesterschrift im Hexateuch literarisch untersucht und theologisch gewertet. Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom alten und neuen Testament*, Folge IV, Heft 13 (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1934).

convincing. Of these two strata J is predominant in the narrative sections, whereas P is heavily weighted with genealogy and contains very little narrative apart from the first Creation Story (1:1–2:4a) and considerable parts of the Story of the Deluge (6:1–9:17 *passim*). Such, in fact, is the distribution of the P elements, that it would appear to be at least a tenable hypothesis that they, instead of forming, as the great majority of critics have held, a literary source parallel to J, are a series of later expansions of and additions to J's original material by a redactor.

However their literary relationship be explained, J and P are very similar in their treatment of mythological materials. But with their obvious interest in origins their real pre-occupation is theological. They are concerned with expounding the dealings of God with the world and with mankind. Thus they have harnessed their myths to great theological themes, Creation, Sin and its Penalty, and Redemption.

Of these themes the second is of particular interest partly because of the predominance of J materials, partly because of the way in which their author has dealt with them. The treatment of this theme supplies us with excellent examples of how the Yahwistic writer, while conserving the form which his stories had in oral tradition, by means of skilful arrangement and deft narrative touches and emphasis in dialogue, proclaims his understanding of the ways of God with man. The contribution of P, on the other hand, is very limited, being confined to his sections of the Story of the Deluge and very slight touches elsewhere. He adds little in the way of theological insight to J's penetrating discussion of man's revolt against God and its fearful consequences.

I

The Story of the Temptation in the Garden, chapter 3, is entirely from the hand of the Yahwistic writer. Though its connections with non-Israelite mythology are far from clear, it is undoubtedly a very ancient myth. It has been suggested that its original form was very similar to the Greek Prometheus story, with the motif of man wresting some forbidden secret from the gods and being accordingly punished.[6] In the current form of the story there are certain internal difficulties. The tree of knowledge is central to the story and crucial in the episode of the temptation; the role of the tree of life is by no means clear. In the previous chapter both trees are mentioned (2:9), but the former tree only is forbidden to men (2:17) and is thus spoken of in the dialogue between the woman and the serpent (3:3–5). The tree of life re-appears in connection with man's expulsion from the Garden (3:22). Many scholars[7] have sought to explain this feature as due

6. Cf. Hans Schmidt, *Die Erzählung von Paradies und Sündenfall* (Tübingen, 1931), where it is suggested that the original secret was of a sexual nature, a view apparently shared by C. A. Simpson in *The Interpreter's Bible*, vol. I, p. 497.

7. E.g. Simpson in *The Interpreter's Bible*, vol. I, p. 496. The opposite view, that the tree of life is integral to the story, is maintained by Humbert in *Études sur le récit du Paradis et de la Chute dans la Genèse* (Mémoires de l'Université de Neuchatel, XIV, 1940).

to conflation of literary sources; others have contented themselves with supposing that the author drew on parallel versions of the same myth current in oral tradition. Among the marks of primitiveness may be mentioned the naive picture of the Deity taking a walk in the Garden in the cool of the day (3:8).

Despite such marks of primitive origins, there can be no doubt that the Yahwistic writer has harnessed the story to a theological purpose. This is apparent from the motive with which the serpent beguiles the woman to eat of the forbidden tree—"You will be like God," or "You will become godlike" (3:5). As for the consequences of man's disobedience, the writer has presented them with great skill. First of all, man has been alienated from his Maker. The man and the woman hide from Yahweh's presence after their transgression of His command; the penalty of their transgression is their expulsion from the Garden. Yet their alienation is not complete, in that they remain the object of His care. Furthermore, man has been alienated from himself. The writer suggests this by the vivid symbol of the shame felt by the man and the woman at their own nakedness, as well as their sense of guilt in Yahweh's presence, and their eagerness to blame others for their sinful act. In addition, there is the mutual alienation of the sexes, in that woman's subjection is part of her penalty—

> Your desire shall be for your husband,
> and he shall rule over you. [3:16]

Besides, man is alienated from the creation of which he is part. Between him and the serpent there is bitter enmity—

> I will put enmity between you and the woman,
> and between your seed and her seed;
> he shall bruise your head,
> and you shall bruise his heel. [3:15]

The serpent, a creature of Yahweh and thus intrinsically good, has become a symbol of evil, the visible embodiment of its presence in the world. A further instance of man's alienation from nature is to be seen in the frustration wherewith his work, the very means whereby he subsists, is cursed. In contrast with the fertile oasis in which he has hitherto lived and which has was appointed to tend (2:15) the man now learns that

> Cursed is the ground because of you;
> in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life;
> thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you;
> and you shall eat the plants of the field.
> In the sweat of your face
> you shall eat bread. [3:17–19]

The woman's vocation of motherhood is cursed, for

> I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing;
> in pain you shall bring forth children.
> [3:16]

Over all human endeavour hangs the final frustration of death—

> Till you return to the ground,
> for out of it you were taken;
> you are dust,
> and to dust you shall return. [3:19]

The characteristic *adam-adamah* (man and soil) theme of the Yahwistic creation story is thus resumed, but with what a bitter sting! Of course neither the Yahwistic author nor his successor, the priestly writer, had any notion of existence after death other than the conventional doctrine of Sheol, where, in the words of a later writer,

> man lies down and rises not again;
> till the heavens are no more he will not awake,
> or be roused out of his sleep. [Job 14:12]

II

The theme of sin and judgment is continued in the Cainite Cycle in chapter 4, which is also in its entirety from the hand of the Yahwistic author. This cycle was in all likelihood originally separate from the Story of the Temptation, though the author has linked them and integrated them with each other. As for the various myths and legends of which it is composed, they themselves were probably of disparate origin, but were unified in oral tradition around the central figure of Cain.

The first and best known of these elements is the Story of the Fratricide. In its original form it may have had some resemblance to the Roman legend of Romulus and Remus, and like it have been devoid of moral implications. The rivalry between Cain and Abel may reflect strained relations between herdsmen and farmers, the former being the victims. In its present form, however, the fratricide is represented as being motivated by Cain's jealousy over Yahweh's rejection of his own sacrifice in favour of that of Abel. Thus man, having already transgressed Yahweh's command, in the next generation becomes a murderer. The consequence is the institution of blood revenge, at one and the same time a penalty for Cain's crime and a means of protection for him. The privilege of tilling the soil even under the irksome conditions allowed to Adam is denied to Cain, who is thus compelled by the hostility of nature itself to become "a fugitive and wanderer on the earth" (4:12).

In the genealogy which follows the Story of the Fratricide man's downward path continues. His moral deterioration is connected with his advance in civilization. Curiously, Cain, who in the previous story was condemned to be a fugitive and a wanderer, figures as the first city-builder (4:17), a legend which must have originated independently of that of his expulsion from the cultivated land. Cain's genealogy ends with Lamech and his three sons Jabal, Jubal, and Tubal-cain, who are here represented as the originators of the three professions of herdsman, musician, and smith. Lamech himself is depicted not only as the first polygamist, but also as the ultimate

in blood-thirstiness. Not satisfied with the ancestral institution of blood revenge in its original form, he is credited with this fierce outburst—

> Adah and Zillah, hear my voice,
> you wives of Lamech, hearken to what I say:
> I have slain a man for wounding me,
> a young man for striking me.
> If Cain is avenged sevenfold,
> truly Lamech seventy-sevenfold. [4:23f.]

To such lengths has man's *hubris* gone!

III

But the climax of iniquity has yet to come. The Yahwistic writer includes a striking piece of un-reconstructed mythology, the story of the miscegenation between the *b'ne elohim*, "the sons of God," the members of the heavenly court, with the daughters of men (6:1–4). In its origins this myth is clearly parallel to the stories of the amours of Olympian deities with earthly women, but has been toned down to become an explanation of the supposed existence of giants in past ages. "The Nephilim were on earth in those days, and also afterwards, when the sons of God came in to the daughters of men, and they bore children to them" (6:4). In the hands of the Yahwistic writer the myth receives a new significance. Not only is the incident used to provide an explanation for the abridgement of the generous life-spans with which tradition credited man's earliest ancestors; it has become the prelude to the Deluge. For the author it was "the last straw," the culmination of man's sin. In the immediate sequel we are told that "Yahweh saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth," to which J adds the significant theological reflection, that "every imagination of the thoughts of his mind was only evil continually" (6:5). A similar statement is put into the mouth of Yahweh Himself after the end of the Deluge (8:21). No writer in the Old Testament comes closer to stating a doctrine of original sin. Its theologically advanced nature has moved many critics to assume that this statement of the thorough corruption of human nature is a later gloss. Yet, since it shows no affinity with any other pentateuchal stratum, its exclusion from the text of the Yahwistic writer appears to be based on an arbitrary limitation of the author's theological originality. Parallels to this thought are exceedingly rare within the Old Testament. The Priestly writer contents himself with stating that before the Deluge "all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth" (6:12). Among prophetic statements that of Isaiah at his theophany is typical, "I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips" (Isaiah 6:5), but nothing more than the realities of a concrete situation is implied. In the penitential psalm *par excellence*, the *Miserere*, the poet states,

> Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity,
> and in sin did my mother conceive me.
> [Psalm 51:5]

While he confesses that he is a sinner from the very first moment of his existence, the poet scarcely implies a general doctrine of the inherent sinfulness of human nature or of any aspect of it, let alone its hereditary transmission. The terminology of the Genesis passages re-appears in Ben-Sira, where the term *yeçer* (rendered "imagination" by the R.S.V. in Genesis 6:5; 8:21) appears in the statement that God "has left man in the hand of his own inclination" (Ecclesiasticus 15:14). This, however, seems to imply no more than the later rabbinical doctrine that man has both an inclination (*yeçer*) to good and an inclination to evil. A full doctrine of original sin does not appear until later apocalyptic writings with their radical pessimism. Typical of their statements is that of 2 Esdras 4:30—"a grain of evil seed was sown in Adam's heart from the beginning, and how much ungodliness it has produced until now, and will produce until the time of threshing comes."

Thus the writer has prepared for the Deluge, and given it moral justification. Sinful humanity is obliterated; only Noah and his family are spared, because he is the exception—"I have seen that you are righteous before Me in this generation" (7:1).

IV

The myth of the Deluge, however, does not conclude the theme of man's sinfulness. J's note of pessimism re-appears soon after he has related the new beginning after the Flood. Noah has been depicted as a conspicuously righteous and godly man; yet in his family is heard the jarring note of Ham's filial impiety. In the ancient tale recorded by the Yahwistic author Noah is credited with the origin of viticulture and with the discovery of the intoxicating properties of wine. Neither the author nor his source intended thereby to cast any aspersions on Noah's character. Modern times supply us with a close parallel to this tale of discovery in the case of the experiments with chloroform conducted by Sir James Hope Simpson, in the course of which he and his assistants discovered its anaesthetic properties by being overcome by its fumes. The Yahwistic author tells us how Ham takes advantage of his father's stupor to mock his nakedness, an act which to the Hebrew sense of propriety was highly offensive. Ham's sin becomes the occasion of the divine curse upon the Canaanites, whose ancestor he is, and of the blessing upon Shem, Israel's ancestor, and on Japheth.

An act of human insolence with far-reaching effects, not just for a single people or group of peoples, but for the whole of mankind, is related in the Babel Story (11:1–9). Here too we find what is apparently crude mythology, for Yahweh is represented as descending to earth to find out what men are doing (11:5). It would seem that the report of a huge, unfinished temple tower in Mesopotamia gave rise to the story that its construction and that of the adjacent ruined city were stopped by divine intervention. Subsequently, the multiplicity of languages and the dispersal of mankind over the earth were explained as due to this same intervention of the Deity.

At what stage the various elements were combined into the present version of the story is uncertain. The seeming internal inconsistencies have led to attempts to dissect this story into parallel versions belonging to separate literary sources.[8] Such attempts, however, are often based on false antitheses and are hardly necessary to explain the narrative. Whatever its origins, for the Yahwistic author the story of this prototypal skyscraper, which he relates with all its primitive touches, serves to illustrate the thesis which he has put into the mouth of Yahweh after the Deluge—"the imagination of man's mind is evil from his youth" (8:21). After the Deluge, no less than before it, sinfulness is universal, and its effects involve the whole of mankind.

The literary author of the J document has thus out of a variety of disparate myths and stories constructed a remarkably coherent theological picture of man's revolt against his Maker and of its terrible consequences.

V

It has been common in the past for specialists and non-specialists alike to dismiss the earliest writer of the Pentateuch as one whose religion was primitive and naive. They have frowned upon his extensive use of myth and legend, his retention of so many of the more vivid features of such materials, and, above all, his failure to delete what appear to be crassly anthropomorphic descriptions of Deity. Such an estimate fails to do justice to his creative genius. The author of the J document did not despise the available materials of myth, legend, and folk tale, nor was he controlled by them, but selected from them and arranged them in a very significant and profound theological pattern. One who out of such materials could construct a prologue to the story of Yahweh's dealings with Israel which would relate them to His dealings with mankind and with the world was no mean theologian. In principle, whatever subordinate position might be conceded to non-Israelite deities, he views Yahweh, Israel's God, as the universal and supreme Deity.

The Yahwistic writer had asserted the goodness of all that Yahweh had created by utilizing the vivid imagery of the Garden myth to depict the perfect environment which He provided for man when He created him. At the same time he saw the dark shadow of sin encroaching upon man's primaeval bliss, and used the series of myths beginning with the story of the Forbidden Tree to give an arresting picture of the gathering gloom as man progressively becomes entangled in the toils of his own iniquity. And so man's sin brings upon him inevitable punishment. Yet this writer describes how the divine mercy is operative side by side with the divine wrath. Not only does Yahweh continue His loving care towards man in his state of rebellion, but step by step He makes provision for man's redemption. Thus the great drama of judgment and annihilation in the Deluge becomes the occasion for a new start for humanity in the person of Noah. The series of

8. Cf. Gunkel, *Genesis*, pp. 93 ff.; Skinner: *Genesis* (New York, ICC, 1910), pp., 223 f.

chosen persons, beginning with Seth and continuing through Noah, sets the stage for the election of Abraham, Israel's ancestor, to be the one through whom "all the families of the earth will bless themselves" (12:3). The author knows the universality of sin; he looks forward to a universal redemption.

The Yahwistic writer's theological outlook dominates the Primaeval History. The priestly writer, whether he is viewed as being the author of a parallel and independent work, or as expanding the Yahwistic work by the addition of a running commentary, has followed the precedent set him centuries earlier. While in other matters he has much to add to the work of his predecessor, on the subject of sin and its consequences he is content to re-affirm the insights of J.

If this view of the Yahwistic writer as a profound theologian is correct, it has important consequences for scholarship. Possibly the early date usually assigned to the J document must be revised. On the other hand, a reconsideration of the common view of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel may be indicated. Scholarly reconstructions have concentrated on the lower levels of that religion, the prevalence of syncretism with Canaanite Baalism, the common assimilation of the practices and beliefs of Yahwism to those of the fertility cults.[9] The existence of a higher level of Yahwism, of a faith such as that of the author of the oldest strand of the Pentateuch, has commonly been ignored.[10] Thus the prophets are made to appear as radical innovators who proclaim their message in a religious vacuum. On our interpretation of the Yahwistic author the prophets have much in common with him. They are seen as appealing to the true meaning of Israel's tradition much as he had understood it, and as drawing from it new inferences which led to the ultimate triumph of ethical monotheism in Israel. Thus their claim to represent the pure form of Israel's religion is signally vindicated.

9. E.g. Oesterley and Robinson, *Hebrew Religion.*

10. See, however, Welch, *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom* (Edinburgh, 1912), pp. 11 ff., Muilenburg in *The Interpreter's Bible,* vol. I, pp. 314 f.

An Experiment in Ecumenical Worship

An Examination of Public Worship in the Protestant Chapels of the Armed Forces of Canada

J. A. DAVIDSON

IN the "Faith and Order" symposium of a few years ago, *Ways of Worship*, Professor R. Will, the Alsatian Lutheran scholar, said, "There can be no question of creating an ecumenical type of Christian worship."[1] Perhaps he is right; the other essays in the symposium suggest that he is.

But perhaps he is wrong. Surely it is not a purpose of ecumenical discussion to try to predict what is and what is not possible in the working out of the ecumenical impulse, to forecast the directions in which the Holy Spirit will lead us.

For the regular chaplains in Canada's armed forces ecumenicity in public worship is not merely something to be talked about or an academic concept or a bit of high-level ecclesiastical blue-printing, or even a once-in-a-while gesture. For them it is a pressing week-by-week concern. And this concern is being given concrete expression in an experiment in ecumenical worship. In recent years the chaplains have had to face the challenge of groups of servicemen and their dependents in more or less isolated stations, people from all the Churches of the nation who desire corporate worship and congregational fellowship. Circumstances are such that this worship and fellowship cannot be provided denominationally. One answer, of course, would have been a sort of non-denominational community church enterprise. But the Canadian Churches wisely refused to accept that kind of enterprise and demanded that the Church in the armed forces be inter-denominational and not non-denominational. The experiment in ecumenical worship came out of the pastoral challenge provided by the servicemen and their families and from the ecumenical realism of the Churches.

In 1950 the *Divine Service Book for the Armed Forces*, was published under the authority of the Minister of National Defence and with the approval of the Committee on Chaplain Services in the Forces of the Canadian Council of Churches. For some eight years now the use of this book has been mandatory in the ordinary services of public worship in the Protestant chapels of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. (In the Canadian armed forces the chaplaincies are organized in two separate but parallel branches, Roman Catholic and Protestant. Each branch has its own chapel now in most camps, stations, etc.) It is too early to assess the significance and success of this experiment in ecumenical worship, but perhaps an account of it thus far is of some value in current ecumenical conversation.

1. *Ways of Worship* (London, SCM, 1951), p. 215.

This book was prepared by a group of regular chaplains. In the foreword the late John W. Woodside, then president of the Council, pointed out the aims and the significance of the book in these words:

> This service book is designed to meet the religious needs of the men and women in the various branches of the Forces.
>
> It has been most carefully prepared, having in mind always the values attached to both ancient and modern expressions of religion and offering a happy combination of both free and liturgical forms of public worship.
>
> The book breathes the spirit of ecumenicity. It helps to make visible the common ground where we may worship together. . . .
>
> Our hope and prayer is that this book may be greatly used and blessed in the high purpose which called it forth.

The armed forces of Canada had chaplains during the First World War, but there were no regular chaplains serving in the very small regular forces between the two wars. During the Second World War each of the forces had chaplaincies, and after the war regular chaplains were appointed to serve in the considerably expanded permanent forces. In the large permanent stations of the new peace-time forces, with their extensive barracks for single servicemen and housing provisions for married men and their dependents, the problem of the ordering of public worship became one of considerable importance for the chaplains.

War-time methods were soon seen to be unsuitable under the new conditions. The Army, for example, during the war used a small worship booklet which contained a rather stark and inflexible order of service, a few prose psalms, a small handful of the more obvious hymns, and very little else. (It almost seems to have been designed to distress chaplains of all denominations and to frustrate the worshippers!) It was soon apparent that this booklet was most unsuitable for use under the new conditions. Similar difficulties were faced in the other two services.

For about three years the situation was confused. The orders and forms of worship generally were devised *ad hoc* by the chaplains in each place. There was some vague direction from the various headquarters, but each chaplain was pretty much on his own. It is to the credit of the chaplains then serving that, with few exceptions, they were respectful of the traditions and susceptibilities of all denominations.

Most Protestants in the armed forces of Canada are members or adherents (this last term must include those who had to tell the recruiting sergeant something and named the first Church that came to mind) of the United Church of Canada and of the Anglican Church of Canada, and there are considerable numbers of Presbyterians and Baptists, an appreciable number of Lutherans, and a few members of the smaller denominations. Chaplains from each Church are appointed in numbers approximately proportional to the numbers of persons in the forces stating affiliation with that Church.

The initial problem was to devise a pattern for corporate worship that would provide a suitable instrument of worship for denominationally mixed

congregations. It was necessary to work out something that would satisfy both those accustomed to predominantly liturgical worship (Anglican and Lutheran) and those accustomed to predominantly "free" worship (United, Presbyterian, and Baptist).

The Anglican Church of Canada uses *The Book of Common Prayer* (Canadian revision) with its mandatory liturgy. The various Lutheran bodies also have their distinctive liturgies. In both the United and Presbyterian Churches worship is in the Reformed mode, with its controlling principle of "ordered liberty." Worship in these two Churches is nearly identical, and they can be treated together for the purpose of this study. Each of these Churches has its own *Book of Common Order.* The forms and orders for congregational worship in these two books are not prescriptive: they are merely descriptive and suggestive, and are used only as guides and aids in worship. Worship in most Baptist congregations in Canada is now similar to that in the United and Presbyterian Churches.

The main problem faced by the compilers of the *Divine Service Book* was that of devising a mode of worship that would be fair to the divergent worship traditions and at the same time provide a usable vehicle for corporate worship.

Divine Service Book for the Armed Forces

The *Divine Service Book* is designed for use by the people as well as by the chaplains, and its comprehensiveness makes it well suited, in its plan at least, for the purpose for which it was issued. The following is a brief account of its various parts.

(*a*) *Order of Divine Service.* This is the Order which must be used at regular public worship in the chapels of the armed forces.

1. Call to Worship (Sentences of Scripture)
2. Prayer of Invocation
3. Hymn
4. Prayer of Confession, said in unison. Absolution or Prayer for Pardon
5. The Lord's Prayer ("trespasses" version)
6. Psalm, read responsively. The Gloria Patri
7. First Lesson
8. Hymn
9. Second Lesson (if so desired)
10. The Apostles' Creed
11. Prayer of Adoration, Thanksgiving, and Intercession
12. The Offerings
13. Hymn or Anthem
14. Sermon
15. Hymn
16. The National Anthem
17. The Benediction.

Changes necessary for the use of a Processional and a Recessional may be made. The offerings may be gathered and dedicated immediately after the Sermon. But apart from these minor changes the use of this order in its entirety is mandatory, except for the omission of the Hymns and the Prose Psalm, when circumstances, such as those of field service, warrant omission.

Five prayers of Confession are provided within the Order. The first one is the "erred and strayed" one from Anglican morning and evening prayer. The second one, "sinful nature and prone to evil," is found in *The Hymnary* of the United Church and in that of the Baptists, and in the worship books of these and other Churches. The other three are shorter; all are well-known.

(*b*) *A Treasury of Devotion: Prayers and Devotional Material for Public and Private Use* is a fairly comprehensive collection of prayers classified under the following heads:

Invocation and Adoration (7)
Absolution (2)
For Pardon (3)
For Grace (6)
Thanksgiving (4, including one short litany of Thanksgiving)
Intercession (3 general, 12 special)
Prayers of Petition (60, including 14 for special days of the Christian and Civil Years; most of these are in Collect form)
Children's Prayers (16, including one short litany of Thanksgiving)

This is, on the whole, a good collection of prayers for public worship, and it draws on the worship heritages of all the Churches.

(*c*) Three Communion Orders are included. The first one is the *Order for the Celebration of Holy Communion* in the Anglican prayer-book. The second is based directly on the first *Order for the Celebration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion* in the United Church *Book of Common Order*, although the flexibility of the original order has been considerably curtailed. The third one was provided by the Presbyterians: it is liturgically sound.

(*d*) *Prose Psalms, Responsive Readings and Canticles.* Fifty-five prose Psalms (or portions) are provided for responsive reading. These are all in the Authorized Version, and the selection is identical to that in the back of *The Hymnary* of the United Church of Canada and *The Hymnary* of the Baptist Union of Canada. Four other selections are provided for responsive reading: Isaiah 53 (part), Isaiah 55, I Corinthians 13, and Romans 12.

The Canticles, etc., include most of the standard canticles from the worship books of the various Churches.

(*e*) The hymnal section contains 256 hymns, which include seven "specials" (e.g. "Airman's Prayer," "High Flight," and "Veni Creator"). It is easy to criticize this selection of hymns, and nearly every regular user of the book laments the omission of certain hymns. But it is a comprehensive selection, drawn from the hymnals of all the Churches. All except 53 of the 256 are found in the Anglican *Hymn Book*—and of these 53, 23 are psalms

in metre that are found in the Baptist, Presbyterian, and United hymnals. All except 20 of the 256 are in the United and Baptist hymnals, and the proportion is roughly the same for the Presbyterian *Book of Praise*. Thirteen of the hymns are in the section, "For Little Children." It is rather difficult to criticize on denominational grounds this selection of hymns.

(*f*) The miscellaneous materials in the book include a section on *How to Use the Bible* (a leaf from the Gideons!), an order for *The Commissioning of a Ship*, and a brief *Order for the Burial of the Dead* for use when a chaplain is not available.

The *Divine Service Book* is issued in two editions, words-only and words-and-music. The format and binding are similar to those of *The Hymnary* of the United Church of Canada, and most of the music is from that book. This is not any indication of denominational preference: the Ryerson Press—which is the United Church Publishing House using a trade-name—produces the book for the Government because it is the only Canadian firm that is able to produce such a book in its entirety and able to maintain facilities for immediate new printings and revisions.

Using the *Order of Divine Service*

Perhaps at this stage a description of the normal Sunday morning worship in a military chapel will illustrate the nature of this experiment in ecumenical worship much more adequately than a more generalized discussion.

St. Barbara's Chapel is the garrison church for the Protestants at Picton Military Camp, Picton, Ontario. This is a fairly small camp, and I am the only Protestant chaplain on the camp staff. The chapel is of simple, modern design, with seating for about three hundred. It is completely equipped with good quality church furnishings. From both the outside and the inside it is seen to be quite obviously a church.

Except on certain special occasions (once or twice yearly), at eleven o'clock on Sunday St. Barbara's very much resembles a small church in a new suburb. It is customary not to wear uniforms at the service; and rank is checked at the door. Families attend as families. The chapel has a Sunday School of about two hundred children. There are two choirs; the senior choir is generally present at the service, but a children's choir leads the praise five or six times a year. The chapel is equipped with an electronic organ.

It is not easy to lead an interdenominational congregation in the worship of God. Mine is a rather intimidating task. It is one thing to conduct worship in a church of a particular denomination with its consistent traditions and characteristic customs; it is quite another thing to lead in worship in a fellowship of people drawn from diverse traditions and ways of worship. Our various traditions and customs are not always readily harmonized. Each of us who worships in St. Barbara's Chapel experiences frustrations and disappointments. Each of us misses certain emphases of the worship in his or her own Church. The Anglicans often yearn for the Morning Prayer

they have known and loved, and for the stately grandeur of the full choral Eucharist. The people from the Presbyterian and United Churches are often homesick for the simpler dignity of the worship in their Churches and for the deep and abiding solemnity of the great congregational celebrations of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The Baptists miss the warmth and the holy simplicity that characterize the worship in their churches. And the Lutherans can never forget the gracious blending of ritual and warm piety that marks Lutheran worship.

The *Order of Divine Service* is admittedly a compromise. It is, I think, a fair and honest compromise; and as such it seems to satisfy, in terms of the purpose for which it was designed, all except the die-hards of each denomination. If the worshippers allow this compromise to make for their frustration as worshippers, then this experiment in worship will eventually be proven a foolish enterprise. But this compromise can be a creative one, and it may be helping to blaze the way to greater unity in the Christian Church. In these military chapels we are facing some of the practical problems that our Churches will have to face in the future as they strive to give effect to our Lord's prayer that "they all may be one." We can learn something of one another's traditions and customs in public worship. We can learn the way of ecumenical courtesy which is so necessary a lubricant in all inter-Church endeavours. And we can learn, in the words of Dean Inge, that "Christendom has never been divided in the chambers where good men pray and meditate."

There is a raggedness in our worship at St. Barbara's—but there are creative values in the very raggedness. Some worshippers kneel for the prayers, and others simply sit and bow their heads: ragged, yes; but they are learning to pray together and learning to avoid that petty heresy which contends that in matters of what can be called "church etiquette" there is only one correct and proper way of doing things. Again, some (among clergy and choir) face the Holy Table for the saying of the Creed, and some do not; some bow at the name of Jesus Christ, and some do not: ragged, untidy, yes; but we are learning to respect customs that differ from our own and to accept the fact that it is not mere dissidence for its own sake, mere cussedness, that causes the other fellow to do as he does. We are learning to be slow with criticism of the manners and modes of worship that differ from those to which we are accustomed. Of course, this raggedness, this untidiness, makes us all a little uneasy—but perhaps out of it will emerge some insights into the ordering of worship for "The Coming Great Church."

The selection of prayers for the services requires great care. One of the great dangers is a curious patch-work effect. We chaplains, if we are at all sensitive about these things, understand what P. T. Forsyth had in mind when he wrote, "Public prayer is, on the whole, the most difficult part of the work of the minister."[2] Public prayer becomes especially difficult when the minister must strive to be fair to several worship traditions.

2. P. T. Forsyth, *The Soul of Prayer* (London: Independent Press, 1917, 1951), p. 75.

At St. Barbara's we make use of all five of the Prayers of Confession that are found in the *Order*, with most use being made of the first two because of their Anglican and United-Presbyterian-Baptist associations. The Prayers of Thanksgiving and Intercession are varied in form from week to week. One week all will be taken from the *Treasury* section of the *Divine Service Book*. Perhaps the next week they will take the form of free or extempore prayer, which is an honoured practice with many of us. Occasionally all the prayers will be taken from the order for Morning Prayer in the Anglican prayer-book. Another time they will come from the worship books of other Churches—Baptist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, United.

The people of St. Barbara's are learning to pray together and to appreciate the rich variety in ways of corporate worship. It is good that the non-Anglican learns something of the riches of *The Book of Common Prayer*. It is good that Anglicans and Lutherans learn something of the essential values in the "free" tradition in worship. It is good that each of us learns something of ways and forms of worship differing from those of his or her own Church.

Sacramental Practice

The Holy Table in every chapel is so placed and set up that, without any changes in the arrangement, the Anglican and Lutheran chaplains can celebrate from in front of it and the Baptist, Presbyterian, and United chaplains from behind. Vessels etc. for both methods of celebration are provided.

All Communion services in the chapels are, by tacit agreement among the Churches, "open." When a Communion service is announced the rite or usage according to which it is to be conducted must be stated, and this is followed by an invitation to "communicants of all Churches." Most people do attend the services which follow usages to which they are accustomed, but there is appreciable attendance at "strange rites."

Ordinarily every chaplain is required to conduct a Communion service at least once a month, and must arrange for regular services according to usages other than his own to be conducted by other chaplains or by civilian clergymen. Communion services must be held at times other than the times of the ordinary divine service; at St. Barbara's they generally come immediately after divine service.

Baptism may be administered during divine service or in the chapel at other times. Generally a chaplain or other clergyman of the parents's denomination officiates, but often parents ask the chaplain to officiate when he is not of their denomination. When this is done the chaplain uses the rite of his own Church, with a non-Anglican chaplain adding the exhortation to godparents when baptizing an Anglican infant (and presumably this is omitted in part when an Anglican chaplain baptizes a non-Anglican infant). Baptist chaplains, of course, are not required to baptize infants.

In administering the sacraments the chaplains are required to follow the usages and practices of their own Churches.

Vestments

Chaplains wear clerical collars when officiating at divine service. Anglicans and Lutherans wear cassock and surplice. Baptist, Presbyterian, and United chaplains wear preaching gowns, and they may wear cassocks and bands with them. Academic hoods may be worn. All chaplains wear the chaplain's scarf, a simple black scarf ornamented at the ends by a crest (each of the forces has a distinctive chaplain's crest), with medal ribbons (or the medals themselves on certain ceremonial occasions) affixed at the left breast position. On sacramental occasions an appropriate stole may be worn in place of the scarf, but no other eucharistic vestments may be worn.

Assessments and Speculations

It is tempting to claim too much for this experiment in ecumenical worship. This method of ordering and conducting corporate worship has been in effective use now for some eight years, and we sometimes tend to presume on this and to take unquestioning satisfaction in the successes so far attained. But all of us, chaplains and regular worshippers, experience frustration, frustration that sometimes verges on despair. In this experiment, despite its real successes, there are points of stress, points of contention, points of danger.

The people from the Churches having fixed and mandatory liturgies are often ill-at-ease in services ordered and conducted much more freely than are the services they are accustomed to. On the other hand, people from the Churches with a "free" tradition in worship do not easily adjust to the more formal, more liturgical, elements in the service. There has been a good deal of sincere give-and-take in the attempt to resolve this stress, but it remains a ground of frustration to chaplains and worshippers from all the Churches. The "raggedness" does have its creative values—but it can become a bit tiresome and distracting at times. About twenty-five years ago, Friedrich Heiler wrote: "The liturgical problem is one of the most important and difficult domestic problems in modern Protestantism."[3] Some of the dimensions of this liturgical problem are laid bare, and in a very practical way, in this experiment in worship.

Each of the Churches has its characteristic ethos which has a profound effect on the response of its people (except the utterly insensitive) to various modes of worship. And it requires great imagination and sympathy for a member of one Church to understand and appreciate an ethos different from that of his own Church. The Baptist writer, Paul Rowntree Clifford, made this point when he wrote, "There is a remoteness of language and thought (in Anglican public worship) which is a serious handicap to those who have not been steeped in the Anglican tradition from early days."[4] By the same token, Anglicans have similar difficulty with respect to "free" forms of worship. This conflict, which comes out of inarticulate, emotional ele-

3. F. Heiler, *Prayer* (Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 303.
4. P. R. Clifford, *The Mission of the Local Church* (London, SCM, 1953), p. 42.

ments in the inner lives of the Churches, cannot be resolved by a bit of liturgical scissors-and-paste work, however skillfully it may be done.

Another point of stress is in sacramental practice. The Anglicans are accustomed to "early celebrations," and the Anglican chaplains carry on that practice. But they are unable to follow the practice now customary in most of their parishes of having a congregational Communion service as the main service once monthly or more often. As a United Church chaplain I must say how inadequate (to the point of being slightly exotic) it sometimes seems to me to officiate at a Communion service that is not a congregational celebration but merely a special little service for a few people who have remained after the main service of worship. Efforts are being made to face the inadequacies of the sacramental provisions for all Churches, but at present this problem, in view of an intensifying in recent years of sacramental concern in all the Churches, remains a point of menacing weakness in our scheme of worship.

Most of us have only a very superficial understanding and appreciation of worship traditions of Churches other than our own. But the circumstances and problems of our interdenominational ministry are impelling many of us to study the worship traditions and the undergirding ethos of each of the other Churches. A. G. Hebert has said, "If the different churches are to understand one another, the mutual study of their liturgical traditions is more important and more fruitful than the discussion of their theological traditions."[5] That is probably a bit extravagant, but Father Hebert does underline a principle of which we have become increasingly aware in our work. Evelyn Underhill further explicated this principle when she wrote, "No ritual pattern can be understood by us until we have penetrated below its surface and observed the spiritual realities which it embodies and seeks to express."[6] This experiment has now reached the stage where mere practical concern can no longer keep it lively: the time has come for study at the deepest levels of the problems and implications of such ecumenical worship.

But despite these weaknesses, despite the problems that may at present seem insuperable, despite the frustrations from which both chaplains and worshippers suffer, this experimental arrangement for corporate worship which came out of practical necessity has been the basis of active and creative congregational and parish life in the permanent camps and stations of the Canadian armed forces. Despite my own doubts and misgivings and frustrations, it has been for me an enlightening and satisfying experience to lead in worship week-by-week in this ecumenical pattern. And as F. R. Barry has written: "Any parish anywhere in Christendom that is building up a significant community of worship and life is performing a vital service both to civilization and to the Christian mission."[7]

5. A. G. Hebert, *Liturgy and Society* (London: Faber and Faber, 1935, 1944), p. 226.
6. Evelyn Underhill, *Worship* (London: Nisbet, 1936), p. 245.
7. F. R. Barry, *The Recovery of Man* (New York: Scribners, 1949), p. 29.

Book Reviews

Job: Poet of Existence. By Samuel Terrien. Indianapolis & New York: Bobbs-Merrill (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), 1957. Pp. 253. $4.25.

The fiction of the patient Job is almost the only remnant in popular thought of one of the greatest poems in any literature. The present work by the Professor of Old Testament at Union Seminary is written for a wider audience than the author's fine commentary in the *Interpreter's Bible*. The more technical discussions in the latter are assumed, thereby eliminating lengthy foot-notes.

A poet of the sixth century B.C. makes the hero of an old Edomite tale of disinterested goodness into one who searches for "the reality by which men can live in an indifferent, hostile, or, at most, meaningless world" (p. 39). Terrien unfolds the development of thought as Job grows more impatient, and is driven to further self-examination by the cold orthodoxy of his "comforters." He flirts with ideas of a mediator (9:33), a heavenly witness and advocate (16: 19, 21), and a redeemer (19:25). He seems to have some hope of seeing God after death. These thoughts are abandoned as Job moves toward his final arrogance (29–31). The author believes that the poem on the inaccessibility of Wisdom (28), and the speeches of Elihu (32–37), were written later by a "poet of the Joban school." However, they form important links between Job's defiance and the Discourses of the Lord.

Though later hands have supplemented the Discourses and Job's recantations, they make an essential contribution to the movement of thought. Job is battered into silence by the first flood of questions, but the poet is not satisfied with negative penitence. The Lord's second speech makes clear that the irony is not of hate, or unconcern, but of love. Job condemns himself and his own pride when he knows God truly as God, when he recognizes a faith, not a belief. He realizes that he is the concern of God, and accepted by Him. He has contemplated God's work, and in a measure participated in His creation.

> Participation in the creative work of the Deity does not remove from existence the enigma and the throbbing ache. . . .
>
> Because the Joban poet foreshadows the theology of the agony of God, by which human agony is shared and borne, his poem can transfigure the perplexity of existence into the will to live triumphantly (p. 247).
>
> By participation in the creating of life, the poet explains nothing, but through his vision, all things are livable.
>
> Job is the poet, hence the prophet, of existence. His poem is neither a treatise nor a masque nor a tragedy. It is a ceremony of sacramental participation in

creativity through which the sense of the holy does not paralyze but quickens one to action (p. 248).

These conclusions may not be altogether satisfying to everyone. On the other hand, the reviewer has heard too many sermons which blithely "explain everything." This refined form of "pie-in-the-sky theology" is perpetrated as if Job had never been written. Terrien is too good a scholar, and too sensitive a mind, to come near such nonsense, and his book should help combat it.

Discussion or criticism of technical points is not necessary in the present context. There are a few minor points to be noted. The titles of chapters 4 and 5, "The Folly of a God-man," and "The Need for a Christ" are provocative, even a bit daring. Very occasionally one is not sure whether the author is expounding Job, or Christian experience. On p. 241 it is not clear whether the suffering of God is inferred from the poem, or drawn from Christianity. The reference to the agony of God on p. 247 may be right, but seems forced in the context. (The lines ascribed to John Donne on the same page are from G. K. Chesterton, *The Ballad of the White Horse*, Book I. They are apposite, no matter who wrote them.)

The entire poem is printed, as poetry, in close connection with the relevant commentary. The text is that of the Authorized Version, "conservatively amended." Job, of all Old Testament books, suffers most when printers ignore the poetic lines, and when archaisms are not corrected.

This book cannot be commended too highly to the wide public for which it was written. It is a fine blend of clear, positive exegesis, with lucid exposition. No preacher can fail to profit. Anyone interested in the Bible is urged to read and re-read this fine work.

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An Introduction to the Apocrypha. By Bruce M. Metzger. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. xii and 274. $4.00.

The unfortunate neglect of the Apocryphal books dates back to about 1600, when the Puritans began to omit them from copies of the Geneva Bible. Luther had been responsible for grouping them separately in his German Bible of 1534, a practice followed by subsequent Protestant versions of the English Bible. Although the Council of Trent (1546) affirmed the canonicity of the Apocryphal writings for adherents of the Roman Church, the attitude of the Protestant communions in relegating the Apocrypha to an inferior position as non-canonical because they were not included in the Hebrew Scriptures, has led to the almost complete neglect of these books. Only in the Anglican Prayer Book do they still find a substantial place. This has been most unfortunate, not only in view of their intrinsic merit (Luther

himself described them as "profitable and good to read"), but also because of their fundamental importance for a knowledge and appreciation of the background of the New Testament and Judaism.

The recent publication of the Revised Standard Version of the Apocrypha may awaken hopes for a revival of interest in this group of writings. The volume under review has been written as a companion to the new version. The author, Professor of New Testament at the Princeton Theological Seminary and a member of the Committee responsible for the translation, has produced a most readable work. Popular rather than technical in its approach, it largely dispenses with footnotes. For this reason it will not take the place of the more detailed introductions of Pfeiffer, Oesterley, Torrey or Goodspeed. Metzger, however, has a contribution of his own to make in the last three chapters of his volume.

The work begins with a discussion of the term "Apocrypha," and continues with an account of the growth of the Hebrew canon. Then follows a series of fifteen chapters, each devoted to one of the Apocryphal writings, including a brief introduction to each—author, date, place of composition, etc.—and a succinct outline of the contents. The three succeeding chapters are of especial interest, dealing with the history of the Apocrypha in the Christian Church, the influence which these writings have exerted on the writers of the New Testament and their later pervasive influence in English literature, in music, art, etc. Two short appendices follow, the first reviewing the current English versions of the Apocrypha, and the second discussing the New Testament Apocrypha. A brief bibliography concludes the volume.

Here and there the reader will encounter curious slips, such as when the author refers to the Ugaritic deity Mot as the god of vegetation (p. 97), whereas he was god of death and the underworld, the god of fertility being Baal-Hadad. But such lapses will not detract from the usefulness of the volume which will, it may be hoped, encourage many to dip into the pages of the very readable new translation of the Apocrypha which Professor Metzger and his associates have provided for us.

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A Commentary on Mark Thirteen. By G. R. Beasley-Murray. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada), 1957. Pp. vii and 124. $3.50.

Dr. Beasley-Murray has already published a work entitled *Jesus and the Future, an Examination of the Criticism of the Eschatological Discourse, Mark 13, with special reference to the Little Apocalypse Theory* (Macmillan, London, 1954). This present volume is complementary to the

former, although the author hopes that it may be viewed as an independent work. Nevertheless, the connection between the two is necessarily extremely close.

Jesus and the Future was a piece of scholarship of which the word exhaustive may be truly used, but out of a great mass of comment and theory, Dr. Beaseley-Murray isolated the major questions, which are indeed simple to state: is the chapter an authentic record of a discourse by Jesus, or is it a compilation of an apocalyptist (perhaps incorporating some genuine sayings of Jesus) built to the general pattern of apocalypses and in a manner foreign to Jesus' own thinking? Dr. Beasley-Murray adopts the view that it is a genuine discourse of the Master, given on the Mount of Olives as he made his way from the Temple to Bethany. It refers to the coming destruction of Jerusalem, which Jesus foresaw as inevitable, but "in the context of" the *eschaton itself*. (The text of the "Abomination of Desolation" saying (13:4) is reconstructed to run: "But when ye see the sign of the abomination, flee into the mountain" and this is taken to refer, not to the *shiqqūts shōmēm* of Daniel, but to the standards of the Roman army: "When you see the Roman forces marching on Jerusalem flee into the hill-country"). We must, Dr. Beasley-Murray maintains, frankly recognize that Jesus was mistaken about the temporal proximity of the *parousia*, and that a right grasp of the doctrine of the Incarnation will help us to meet the theological difficulty that arises. While these views may not command assent at every point, they are nevertheless shown to be worthy of very serious consideration.

Thus we approach a commentary on this chapter on which our author has already lavished so much attention with expectation. Unfortunately, Dr. Beasley-Murray seems to be fascinated by names and cannot be content to isolate the issues but must attach authorities to every view-point, which in view of his earlier work is quite unnecessary. He does, however, enumerate nine considerations put forward at various times by those who do not regard the chapter as authentically dominical, and to each he makes an adequate reply—often by quite rightly pointing out that the consideration is not a fact but merely the implication of a highly-controvertible hypothesis. The weakness of the case for the Little Apocalypse Theory is surprising when it is put rigorously to the test. Positively, our author insists that "the Discourse has two features which distinguish it from the common Jewish apocalypses, viz. its lack of specifically apocalyptic traits, and its warning insistence on spiritual alertness" (p. 17). "If to these positive characteristics we add, as I have endeavoured to show that we may, its congruity with the eschatological teaching contained in the other evangelic sources; and if, as E. F. K. Muller urged, the total design of the Discourse shows specifically Christian points that cannot be explained by an external editing of a Jewish basis; then the question must be faced whether this is not a new building on an original foundation which must be attributed to Jesus himself" (p. 18). With this curiously-equivocal statement of Dr. Beasley-Murray's conviction

that the discourse has as much claim to be considered authentically dominical as any in the gospels, the Introduction closes, and the Commentary itself begins. The method is to quote the Greek text verse by verse and then to comment on the issues raised by it. The aim appears to be two-fold: to show that the saying is in context in its first-century setting, and then to point to its timeless significance. By adopting the basic principle that the discourse refers to the approaching Judean disaster but (in the classical Old Testament manner) *in the context of the eschaton*, Dr. Beasley-Murray meets the difficulties that arise with such success as to go far to prove the soundness of his general approach. While there may be still much room for debate on detail there can be no doubt that he has shown that a conservative approach to the Discourse can be maintained with intelligence and sincerity. Taken together, the two works constitute a notable contribution to the serious study of the eschatological message of Jesus and His Church.

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A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. By C. K. Barrett. London: A. & C. Black (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada), 1957. Pp. viii and 294. $5.00.

A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles. By C. S. C. Williams. London: A. & C. Black (Toronto: Macmillan Co.), 1957. Pp. xvi, 301. $5.00.

These two volumes are the first to appear in a new series to be known as "Black's New Testament Commentaries." Several of the succeeding volumes are announced as under preparation by competent scholars of Britain and America, with Henry Chadwick as general editor. They are planned on about the same level as the Moffatt Commentaries, most of which are now from twenty to thirty years old; like them, they are meant for use by those who have no knowledge of Greek. Each author provides his own translation of the text to accompany the commentary, and indeed to form part of it. The religious and theological interest is to be paramount, with less attention to questions of philology and literary criticism.

Professor Barrett has already made his mark as a commentator with his magnificent edition of the Fourth Gospel, published in 1955. His translation is vigorous, clear, and illuminating. He does not hesitate to resort to periphrasis where it seems to be needed to bring out the essential thought, and in his accompanying comments he always takes pains to justify the interpretation which he has adopted. He gives evidence of a wide acquaintance with modern studies of Romans and of the religion and theology of Paul, with one conspicuous (and unfortunate) exception—he takes no notice

whatever of the notable commentary by John Knox and Gerald R. Cragg in the *Interpreter's Bible* (Vol. IX, 1954). His notes are concise and pithy, and offer a lucid analysis of the movement of the apostle's mind. Particularly thorough treatment is given to the cardinal passages in which the main themes of the letter are set forth, as for instance 3:21–31, which receives eleven pages. The comments on the ethical section (12:1ff.) form perhaps the best part of the book. It will be felt by many readers that Barrett gives inadequate attention to the problems of introduction, and especially that he could not hope to deal seriously with the place of "Romans in the Framework of Paul's Thought" (pp. 7–9) in a few hundred words. Grateful as we are for the running interpretation of the notes, we feel the lack of any attempt to make a comprehensive survey of the theology of the Epistle.

Mr. Williams has already put us in his debt by his revisions of the useful textbooks of McNeile (*Intro. to the Study of the N.T.*, 1953) and Souter (*Text and Canon of the N.T.*, 1953), not to mention his studies in the text of the Gospels. His edition of Acts is by all odds the best that is now available in English. It leaves us wishing that he had undertaken the task on a scale comparable with that of the latest Meyer commentary (ed. by E. Haenchen, 1956), which appeared too late for him to make use of it. It is now nearly forty years since Lake and Cadbury published their monumental five volume work on Acts, and a new full-scale commentary in English is one of the most urgent needs of our New Testament study to-day. Mr. Williams shows a remarkably thorough knowledge of the research of the intervening period, and is manifestly well equipped to undertake the greater task. He makes good use of the articles in learned journals, of the archaeological materials, and of the important studies that have appeared in *Festschriften*. His translation is accurate, but far too literal, even to the point of being a trifle stilted. The questions of introduction are treated briefly, as required by the limited scope of this commentary; but the chief questions are put before the reader with clarity and candour, and with a fair presentation of the arguments on either side. Williams' own views tend to be conservative, but he never becomes a mere apologist for traditional positions. In fact, in some areas he moves far away from the traditional, as in his theory that Acts was composed before the Gospel of Luke; and on many points he is content to suspend judgment, recognizing that the evidence is insufficient to make a firm decision possible. If he has a weakness, it is in his failure to appreciate the possibilities of form-criticism; and his discussion of the chronology of St. Paul's career might have been modified by a consideration of John Knox's important study, *Chapters in a Life of Paul* (N.Y., 1950). As might be expected of him, this expert in textual criticism handles the many, difficult, and complicated problems presented by the text of Acts with knowledge and discernment.

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Introducing New Testament Theology. By A. M. Hunter. London: SCM (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1957. Pp. 160. $2.25.

Professor Hunter tells us in his preface that his purpose in writing this book is to make available to the ordinary minister, the interested layman, and the theological student the latest insights of New Testament scholarship. The book itself is divided into three parts. Part One deals with the Synoptic Gospels, Part Two with the preaching and theology of the pre-Pauline Church, while Part Three, which takes up nearly half the book, discusses the theologies of St. Paul, St. Peter, the author of Hebrews and St. John. The Pastoral Epistles and the Apocalypse are omitted, apparently for lack of space.

The attempt to compress the theology of the New Testament into one hundred and fifty pages obviously creates difficulties which the author has not completely overcome. Some of the pages in Part One read like lecture notes, which need greater elaboration if they are to be understood by the readers for whom the book was intended. The approach is a moderate to an extreme conservative one and the more radical critics are summarily dismissed as having nothing to say. The reader who is unacquainted with Bultmann—and Professor Hunter appears to take it for granted that a large number of his readers will be—will wonder why he is so categorically condemned. The literature which has grown up around the theory that I Peter is a baptismal homily or part of a baptismal liturgy is rejected in one short foot-note. Not all the eschatological sayings in the Gospels can be as neatly fitted together as they are here, nor can all the sayings attributed to Jesus be as readily accepted. To take just one example: Did Jesus regard the physical healings as "evidences" of the presence of the Kingdom? Matthew clearly thought so (Matt. 11:2ff.) but it is not at all clear that Mark did. (The exorcisms are another matter.) Surely it is only in John that the feeding of the multitude creates any popular excitement; Mark goes out of his way to show that not even the Twelve were impressed by it (Mark 8:14–21). It can be persuasively argued that the references to the "last day" in John are little more than concessions to traditional material, and that the centre of John's eschatology lies in the present.

This is not to say that there are not good things in this book. The section on the pre-Pauline Church is extremely well done; the chapter on St. Paul stresses his debt to his predecessors and gives an excellent summary of the Apostle's own contribution to Christian thought; the influence of Judaism on the Fourth Gospel is clearly shown. But the general impression of the book is that scholarship has given us assured results in almost every aspect of New Testament theology. In the opinion of this reviewer the section on the Synoptics particularly should have been much more tentatively stated. Perhaps this was not possible in a book of this size.

It is a matter of regret that a selected bibliography was not included. The purpose of introductions is to arouse curiosity, to lead the student to pursue

the subject further. Books published on the New Testament are far too many for the ordinary minister to buy or even to read them. A selection of them, including some with a different view point from the book under review, would be extremely useful. We hope that if the book is reprinted, Professor Hunter will do this for us.

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The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria. By E. F. OSBORN (*Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature*, N.S., ed. by C. H. Dodd, III). Cambridge: The University Press (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada), 1957. Pp. xi, 206. $5.00.

A DUTY which rests upon the Christian thinker today is that of re-examining and restating the relation of the data of Christian revelation to philosophical wisdom, and of any such effort Clement of Alexandria, writing in the last quarter of the Second Century, stands as the first great representative. Consequently nothing could be more timely than this textual study of the works of Clement.

E. F. Osborn admirably portrays the syncretic nature of Clement's work in which Christian Theology becomes the one true Philosophy, and Philosophy is called upon to "teach a Creator God, the mutability of physical elements, the good as assimilation to God, and the dispensation of the Gospel as the chief part of all training" (p. 122). At the same time, he appropriately stresses Clement's position that within this sycretism there lies an abiding antithesis, the sides of which must be seen in their vital contrast, yet never separated or divided.

The philosophical pattern is that of two unities, "a unity which is simple, bare, one and nothing but one," to be conceived only in terms of negation, and "a unity which is infinitely complex, one and many," which can be described in terms of positive attributes (p. 19). In theological terminology the "one and nothing but one" is the transcendent, unknowable God; and the "one-many" is the immanent Logos, the one Christ uniting many Christian souls by means of " 'participation', 'presence', 'communion' " (p. 53), and revealing the universal scheme of Christian salvation. The antithesis between the "one and nothing but one" and the "one-many" is removed in the Son who is both one and all, both above the world and in it (p. 43). " 'The Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son'. Both are one—namely God" (p. 175).

This theme provides the strategy for an examination of Goodness and Truth (philosophy being for Clement a "knowledge of the Good and of Truth"—p. 98). God's goodness, or goodness in God, is intrinsic, perfect

and complete, transcending all other goodness in its "mode of operation," in being "always active from above," ordaining amongst other things the divine order of providence, conceived of as an educative process, embedded in the world (p. 66)—not an impersonal necessity, but a living, loving Person, giving purpose to history. Goodness in created things is seen as a one-many, the many being all the values inherent in Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic thinking, the one being the assimilation of all of these to the Logos, and in turn to God, on the basis that the human mind is the image of the "divine and kingly Logos" ("the ruling part of man's soul, the intellectual, rational element is divine"—p. 93), who is the image of God (p. 90)—this whole process being something God does in us.

Likewise Truth is a one-many: one in that it has come alone through Jesus Christ and is linked to a living tradition delivered by our Lord to the Apostles and preserved in the Church (in which sense Christianity is essentially true, and all else is false) and many in its diversity of manifestation, which includes not only Christian teaching, but everything consistent with it (in which sense philosophy is an investigation concerning truth and the nature of things—p. 122). This one and many are inseparable from faith which is necessary for knowledge as well as for salvation, knowledge being both of the intellect and of the spirit; and as faith is the starting point, so love is the goal, all of which prepares us for the "face-to-face" vision of God (p. 162). The person in whom this happens is the true gnostic, whose state is not that of being illuminated by the Light, but of actually being Light in the sense that the Lord is the Light and True Knowledge (p. 167). Clement's richest thought lay in this picture of the gnostic united with God in a unity which is related to the whole life (p. 46).

The structural arrangement of the book leaves little to be desired, and certainly the author is to be commended on his accumulation of material—including four noteworthy appendices. The disappointing thing is that it remains an accumulation, without much of a coherent constructive statement by the author himself. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that so often after an able presentation, at the beginning of a chapter, of what the argument is to involve, the argument then tends to become lost in numerous quotations from Clement's predecessors and contemporaries—quotations which tend to divert attention rather than heighten understanding, and in their cumulative effect overshadow the primacy of Clement's thought in the book. This tends to make Clement a Christian in philosophy, rather than a Christian philosopher.

A rather serious omission for the reader today is the lack of any considered appraisal of Clement's place or influence in the thinking that came after him (we find only incidental references to men like Origen and Augustine) or his relevance, if any, to thinking today; which for many of us robs this otherwise commendable study of its more enduring value, and leaves one in doubt as to what was the intention of the author other than to justify Clement in the eyes of his contemporaries. An unavoidable conclusion is

that Clement's contribution to Christian thinking has been somewhat sacrificed to his eclecticism with regard to the philosophical thinking of his day.

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Melanchthon—The Quiet Reformer. By Clyde L. Manschrek. Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. 350. $6.00.

When the famous humanist and Hebraic scholar Reuchlin hellenized the name of his young great-nephew, Philip Schwarzerd, dubbing him Melanchthon, he symbolized the shape of the future. For Philip was to personify the contact between Renaissance and Reformation, to embody the tension between revelation and reason, to represent for all time the mediating wing of the 16th century Reformation. "To understand Melanchthon and to assess his significance one must recognize the two historical movements which combined in him and which have never been reconciled in Protestantism—the Renaissance and the Reformation," writes Manschrek in his Introduction. Melanchthon has been maligned, scorned and caricatured as the friend of Rome, the betrayer of Luther's doctrine, the crypto-Calvinist, the father of Protestant scholasticism. And with twenty-eight volumes of his writings in the *Corpus Reformatorum* we must depend upon the specialist to guide us in assessing this crucial figure.

Professor Manschrek of Duke University has therefore rendered great service in this excellent biography of Melanchthon, beautifully printed and illustrated. The fruit of nine years' research and writing, "The Quiet Reformer" is a quiet book, moving carefully and with a disarming simplicity of language from situation to situation in Melanchthon's life, never raising its voice in theological excitement or declamation. Here is a detailed description of the Reformer's real attitude towards the Roman overtures throughout the complex and lengthy debates and councils in regard to Augsburg and Smalcald. Using Melanchthon's correspondence, Manschrek proves his consistency of purpose and genuine defence of Luther's central doctrine (at least without the *sola*). His concern for the key events of 1530–31 (Chapters 13–16) affords a refreshing perspective for answering the charges against Melanchthon.

Such sympathetic treatment will not please all Lutherans! Nor will it satisfy the questions raised, most recently by Franz Hildebrandt (*Melanchthon: Alien or Ally?* 1946), approaching the Reformer in terms of his "concessions." This is partly due to the two weaknesses of Manschrek's book. One is consistent with his biographical purpose—the lack of theological detail and clarity, which could be filled out by a companion volume (*The Quiet Theology?*). Manschrek's obvious mastery of the Melanchthon corpus of literature demands such a further study.

The second weakness, in this reviewer's opinion, is Manschrek's failure to do justice to the non-Lutheran elements of the Reformation. In proving Luther a friend, he has created new enemies for Melanchthon. It is questionable whether he has given a reliable account of the issues at stake in Marburg, and whether he ought to describe the independent doctrine of the Supper worked out by Melanchthon as a "spiritual view" (240). This doctrine, standing between Luther and Zwingli, ascribing rationalizing modes to both, received its classic shape at the hands of Calvin and Peter Martyr.

But what of Martin Bucer in this history? Manschrek's inconsistency is that he will not treat Bucer with the same sympathy as he has for Melanchthon. Bucer is merely "the opportunist," "the none-too-reliable expediter of union" (231ff.). Yet Bucer could liken himself to Sisyphus, ground down by the stone of disunity—and Bucer's removal to Cambridge was the result of the Augsburg Interim, a persecution hardly consistent with Manschrek's picture. This difficulty perhaps could also be overcome if Manschrek were to follow the theological appetizers he has embodied in his book with a main dish about Melanchthon's doctrine of the Supper and teaching on the role of reason in Christian theology (see p. 96).

These weaknesses do not detract from the main value of the book as the first English biography of Melanchthon in more than fifty years. Manschrek's gift to the Church of our day is manifold. This is a historical work which scholars will find both reliable and provocative. It is written in non-technical language that "working Ministers" and laymen will appreciate. It is relevant to our contemporary scene in that Melanchthon was in a profound sense the "Father of Ecumenicity": "I have lived in councils and it looks as if I will die in one" (p. 221). And it may indicate the kind of bridge research that this era of "common study" in the ecumenical movement requires for speaking the truth in love.

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Reality, Reason and Religion. By A. A. Vogel. New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1957. Pp. xv and 208. $3.00.

It must be said at once that this book is not easy reading. It presupposes more than a superficial acquaintance with Aristotle, Thomism, modern logical positivism and philosophical analysis, not to mention the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, the mental effort required is justified by the importance of the questions raised and their relevance to the contemporary theological and philosophical situation.

The thesis to be defended is outlined in the first chapter with special reference to Aristotle. The author is concerned to defend the possibility and value of metaphysical explanation as against modern positivistic explanation.

The former is based on the premise that being, not thought, is the proper object of the understanding. Ideas or concepts refer beyond themselves to their objects and are the means *by which* we understand. Explanation involves not merely scientific description but causal explanation in answer to the question "why?" Hume's psychological analysis of causality and Kant's solution of the problem in the Critical Philosophy are both vigorously discussed and repudiated in favour of Aristotelian metaphysical explanation. Causality is not a peculiar point of view which we inject into things for our own convenience but is really "in the facts." This defence of the traditional type of metaphysical explanation is buttressed by a penetrating critique of the epistemological problems involved in modern positivistic and scientific explanations. The inadequacy of the latter's account of causality is well brought out and illustrated from modern thinkers concerned with the philosophy of science. There is much useful information here, apart from the particular topic under consideration. The author is firmly convinced, however, that the post-Kantian tendency to let logic and epistemology determine the nature of metaphysics must be rejected. Those whose philosophical training is predominantly modern and Kantian will no doubt be impatient with this claim and see in it only the rehabilitation of Aristotle for dubious theological reasons. However, this writer sympathizes with this effort to rethink all these problems without assuming that Kant has said the last word.

The rest of the book is concerned with the building up of a constructive metaphysical position. It is impossible to summarize in a few sentences an argument very closely knit. Chapter VI on "Religious Implications" has much interesting discussion of the nature of analogy and symbol and the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God. Nature is not intelligible without the causal concept. The "proofs" are rather metaphysical completions of this world. There is no merely "logical" proof of existence. But the proofs start from existence, not merely from ideas or concepts. The treatment of God and Free Will is perhaps the most difficult chapter of all and to this writer the least convincing. More than one reading is required to make a judgment on this question.

Many readers will doubtless find most interest in the chapter entitled "The Dead God." This considers the charge brought against the traditional Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics that it offers us a static God quite incompatible with the living, dynamic God of biblical history. Professor Paul Tillich's criticism along these lines is considered and again Dr. Vogel thinks that the classical tradition can be vindicated against this charge. Dynamism and life can be literally and formally predicated of God. Each is capable of analogical presence in God without involving God in creaturely imperfection. *Actus purus* is not pure form but absolute perfection and infinity of being-itself. God then is dynamic fullness and activity, not static emptiness and quiescence.

Much of this review has been inevitably taken up with some attempt to

indicate the thesis which the author is defending. "Back to Aristotle" may in some quarters appear to be reactionary in the worst sense, though it would be unfair to Dr. Vogel to think that he is recommending an uncritical acceptance of the whole of Aristotelian philosophy or that he is ignoring all later thinking. However, after his very competent survey of ancient and modern thought, it seems indisputable that Aristotle is far more relevant to the contemporary intellectual situation in science, philosophy and theology than many of us have been willing to admit.

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When Christ Comes and Comes Again. By T. F. Torrance. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1957. Pp. 192. 12/6.

This is a book of sixteen sermons which Dr. Torrance has preached in various parish Churches, school chapels and over the radio. His chief purpose in publishing them is, in his own words, "to offer, if only in a small way, some doctrinal material for the use of those actively engaged in the work of evangelism, as well as of the ordinary reading public in our congregations which increasingly demand a more thoughtful presentation of the Christian message." Many people who are concerned with evangelism today are aware of the danger of presenting the Gospel in a highly emotional manner to great masses of people without sufficient attention to the theological implications of the great themes of the New Testament. The author has been careful to choose sermons which deal with subjects most frequently on the lips of evangelists. This underlying purpose must be remembered when the sermons are read; otherwise the reader will be critical of the recurring challenge to be "born again" and of personal commitment.

I think one of the most useful comments I can make is to contrast my first reaction to the book and my later more considered opinion. In the preface the author says that he re-wrote the sermons, so that they are "for the most part, much longer, and of course more theological, than when they were preached. They have largely been shorn of their character of direct address as well as of illustrative and literary material." As I read the sermons I felt that this method of dealing with the subject had been fatal for they were neither sermons nor theological essays. After all, if the author found it necessary to inject theology and remove illustrations there was not much point in calling them sermons suitable for evangelical preaching. My approach to the pages that followed was prejudiced by this statement.

As I proceeded with the book, however, I found the material most interesting and helpful. Many of the well-known themes with which every preacher has dealt were treated in a fresh and stimulating way. After all, when the reading of a sermon sets a preacher on fire to tackle the theme

embodied in the written word surely the author has accomplished his purpose. This is what Dr. Torrance does for me.

I particularly like the stress he gives to the Incarnation of Our Lord as an antidote for any who still over-emphasize the human Jesus. One quotation from his sermon on the Coming of Christ from the point of view of His mother will illustrate what I mean.

"And so Jesus was born, the Son of the Highest, born from above. Jesus Christ was born into this world, not from it. He did not evolve out of humanity. He came into humanity. Jesus is not the product of man, but the Creator of man. He is not just the best human being; He is the Being who cannot be accounted for by the human race at all. Jesus is not man becoming God, but God becoming man—God incarnate, God descending into human flesh, coming into it from outside and from above, in order to be one of us, and to be one with us."

This is a book preachers will find very useful especially if they like an expository sermon, logically developed on the important themes of the Gospel which challenges men to accept Christ as their Saviour.

George B. Snell

Synod House
Toronto, Ontario

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